

JPRS-TAC-91-005
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

The service, first called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, was established in 1941 prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. At the time, a number of U.S. Government officials were concerned about the content of foreign radio broadcasts—a relatively new means of conveying information and propaganda across borders. On their advice, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in late February 1941 allotted money from his emergency fund to institute the recording, translating, transcribing, and analyzing of selected foreign broadcasts for the U.S. Government. During World War II the service demonstrated that monitoring was a fast, economical, and reliable way to follow overseas developments.

Today the Foreign Broadcast Information Service provides its consumers throughout the federal government, according to their diverse official interests, with information from a broad range of foreign public media. FBIS information also is available to readers outside of the government, through the National Technical Information Service. Objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness are our production watchwords.

We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Arms Control

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Foreign Ministry Spokesman Opposes 'Any' CW Use

*OW0702084691 Beijing XINHUA in English
0834 GMT 7 Feb 91*

[Text] Beijing, February 7 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today that China is always opposed to any act of using chemical weapons [CW] in violation of the norms of international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

In response to reporter's questions, the spokesman also said at the weekly news briefing here this afternoon that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is an established norm of international law.

USSR's Omelichev Hits 'Distortions' on Soviet Policy Process

*OW1702051091 Beijing XINHUA in English
0243 GMT 17 Feb 91*

[Text] Moscow, February 16 (XINHUA)—A senior Soviet military official has refuted press reports from both home and the West which have tried to distort Soviet policy on the limitation of armaments.

The Soviet Defence Ministry and the General Staff have never unilaterally adopted any resolutions on the limitation of armaments and arms supply as such resolutions can only be adopted in a joint effort with the Foreign Ministry and other related departments.

The statement was made by First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Bronislav Omelichev in an interview with the Soviet Army newspaper, KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) which published the interview today.

The Soviet Union has set up a trans-departmental apparatus for talks on arms limitation. All related resolutions can be adopted only after collective discussions, with the most important ones needing approval by the top Soviet leadership, Omelichev noted.

Press distortion of Soviet arms limitation policy is aimed at disrupting information for Western governments to continue cooperating with the Soviet Union to solidify world security, and represents an attempt to sow discord between Soviet political and military leaders and to damage the state and national interests of the country, he pointed out.

HUNGARY**Joint Committee Formed for Soviet Troop Pullout**

*LD1502155791 Budapest MTI in English 1359 GMT
15 Feb 91*

[Text] Budapest, February 5 (MTI)—Lieutenant General Antal Annus and Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov, government emissaries, held talks about economic and financial matters relating to the pull-out of Soviet troops from Hungary, at the Budapest headquarters of the Soviet Southern Army Group on Tuesday.

An agreement was reached on the setting up of a Hungarian-Soviet joint committee to take charge of all professional, property, economic and financial issues, and to supervise the work of a technical sub-committee which will handle matters connected with the on-the-spot sale of real estates.

Annus and Shilov discussed the procedure of surveying the environmental damage caused by the Soviets and approved by experts, and appointed bodies to take the necessary measures should environmental disputes arise.

Soviet Army Official Cited on Troop Withdrawal

*LD1302201591 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 13 Feb 91*

[Excerpts] Government-level negotiations regarding the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary started a year ago. In accordance with this, Soviet soldiers will leave Hungary by 30 July. [passage omitted]

Lieutenant General Kyrov, representative of the Soviet Government, said the pullout is progressing according to schedule. As of today, 90 percent of the tank and artillery units, 74 percent of the soldiers, and all the fighting helicopters left the country. One hundred and one barracks were handed over, which is 60 percent of their real estate stock. Of course, making out the accounts is still to come, although the Soviet party has again confirmed its proposal, according to which they would like to get 50 percent of the value of real estate already handed over as soon as possible.

The value of the (Szeged Othalmi) barracks vacated today is estimated at 450 million forints. The local government would like to operate this as a university campus in future.

Defense Ministry Spokesman on Pact, USSR Troops

*LD1502155791 Budapest MTI in English 1359 GMT
15 Feb 91*

[Text] Budapest, February 15 (MTI)—Co-operation, deterrence and defence are the buzzwords of Hungary's new defence code, which was approved at the government session on February 14. The Defence Ministry proposal, together with the security policy package of the Republic of Hungary, will come up for discussion in April. Lieutenant General Antal Annus, economic secretary of state at the Defence Ministry, has told a news conference.

The military organization of the Warsaw Treaty is to be dismantled by April 1, with the written consent of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. External circumstances calling for the elaboration of the new military code and the organization of an independent national army on the principle of deterrence implies the use of political, economic and other non-military methods of avoiding conflicts. It is necessary to conclude new military co-operation agreements with the neighbouring countries, including adequate security guarantees. Such a contract has already been signed with Romania and Czechoslovakia, and one with the Soviet Union is in the offing.

The new military doctrine is based on the principle of sufficient defence, meaning that there are no preconceived ideas about enemies, and a defensive approach will prevail in the military.

Antal Annus said that the new doctrine would entail re-groupings within the army and major cuts in strength in the second half of 1991. The new defence law is also to go before parliament this year, when the new service regulations and officer's training system will be adopted. Admissions to the military college have already been reduced by a third.

Answering a question, the lieutenant general said that a shift had taken place in the settlement of financial disputes surrounding the Soviet troops pull-out. The emissaries of the two governments are expected to sign an agreement next week on the procedure of handing over and appraising the emptied buildings, and surveying the environmental damage caused by Soviet troops. A Soviet-Hungarian joint committee could also be set up to decide the ways and means of fixing the value of buildings that do not comply with Hungarian standards, and are, therefore, considered worthless by the Hungarian side. (four-fifths of Soviet military facilities in Hungary fall into this category.)

The Hungarian standpoint is that payments can only be effected after the pull-out is complete. The Soviets put the value of real estates to be handed over at 1,200 million roubles, and are asking for half of the sum to be paid immediately, with the rest subject to subsequent talks.

POLAND

Order on Restricting Chemical, Explosive Exports

91WC0041A Warsaw *DZIENNIK USTAW* in Polish
No 76, Item No 450, 12 Nov 90, pp 1025-1026

[Executive Order, Item No. 450, of the Council of Ministers, dated 5 November 1990, governing the creation of temporary restrictions for the exports of chemical substances and dual-purpose explosive materials which may be used directly or indirectly to manufacture weapons]

[Text] Pursuant to Article 9 of the Customs Law dated 28 December 1989 (Dz.U., No. 75, Item No. 445) the following is decreed:

Paragraph 1. Restrictions are introduced effective until 31 December 1991 on the exports abroad of the chemical compounds and dual-purpose explosives which may be used directly or indirectly to manufacture weapons, and are enumerated in the annex to the present executive order.

Paragraph 2. The restrictions set forth in Paragraph 1 consist of the duty to obtain an export license.

Paragraph 3.1. A license to export dual-purpose chemical substances is issued if:

1) The importer provides assurances in the contract that the chemicals purchased will be used exclusively for purposes other than the production of chemical weapons.

2) A proper state organ in the importer country has issued a declaration in which it certifies that the purchased substances will be used for purposes other than the production of chemical weapons.

3) A contract provides for a ban on the reexport or transfer of chemical substances by an importer to a third party.

3.2. The conditions set forth in Subparagraph 1, Point 2 are not required if a proper state organ in the importer country provides documentation to the effect that this country has assumed obligations under international law not to develop or produce chemical weapons, or to otherwise acquire, transfer, stockpile, or use them.

3.3. A license to export dual-purpose explosives is issued if:

1) An importer provides assurances in the contract that the explosives purchased will be used exclusively for the purpose of mining.

2) A contract provides for a ban on the reexport or transfer of explosives by the importer to a third party.

Paragraph 4. This Executive Order takes effect on the day of publication.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers: T. Mazowiecki

Annex to the executive order of the Council of Ministers dated 5 November 1990 (Item No. 450)

List of Dual-Purpose Chemical Substances and Explosives to Which Export Restrictions Apply

Item	Name	Designation in the Systemic Product List or the Foreign Trade Merchandise Assortment
1	Cyanogen chloride	1241-000
2	Carbonyl chloride	1241-561
3	Hydrogen cyanide	1221-841
4	Phosphorus oxychloride	1221-436
5	Phosphorus trichloride	1221-449
6	Chloropicrin (nitrotrichloromethane)	1241-881
7	Thiodiglycol	1241-919
8	Dimethylamine hydrochloride	1241-813
9	Chloroethanol	1241-371
10	Compounds with phosphorus methyl-group bonding	1241-989
11	Mining explosives in raw form	1333-1
12	Mining explosives	1333-2
13	Mining detonators	1333-3

Germans 'Ignorant' of Facts on Soviet Convoys

AU0602191391 Warsaw *POLSKA ZBROJNA* in Polish
4 Feb 91 p 2

[Unattributed commentary: "Who Wants To Misinform German Public Opinion?"]

[Text] One hundred thousand Soviet soldiers will leave Germany this year, together with 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 100 airplanes and helicopters. They will vacate barracks in such places in the former GDR as Halle, Neuruppin, Sendal, Kramnitz, and Ohrduf. This decision, news of which has just been released in Bonn, was made at a meeting of the German-Soviet "working group for preparing and coordinating a planned withdrawal of the Soviet forces in Germany" in Strausberg on 24 January.

According to decisions made so far, the withdrawal of USSR units will take place with equal intensity in 1992 and 1993, and the last units will leave in 1994. The Bonn-Moscow agreement calls for the completion of the entire operation by then. A total of 16 divisions will leave the former GDR over the next four years.

The detention of Soviet transports by Polish border guards has been causing concern in Germany for some time. The WELT AM SONNTAG weekly says that "Poland's demands and reservations may, under certain circumstances, hinder the fulfillment of evacuation plans." In addition, writes the weekly, Poland is demanding "considerable fees for transit traffic," and because the USSR wants to adhere to its agreements with Germany, Moscow must conclude an agreement with Warsaw on this subject.

Let us remind our readers that German public opinion is generally ignorant of the motives behind the conduct of the Polish authorities, and thinks that Poland is interfering with the implementation of the German-Soviet agreements. Nevertheless, the German media have recently carried reports on Polish misgivings about improper markings on vehicles (in the case of humanitarian transports carrying gifts), or about the total absence of a transit agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union.

Spokesman on Soviet Troop Withdrawal, Transit From Germany

AU0802210691 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian
7 Feb 91 p 6

[Interview with Foreign Ministry Spokesman Wladyslaw Klaczynski by Miklos Ritecz in Warsaw in February 1991; "Warsaw Is Realistic About the Lithuanian Affair"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] Talking about the Budapest-Prague-Warsaw "triangle," Wladyslaw Klaczynski told our reporter that there are no differences in opinion as far as "strategic" issues are concerned, but that there are naturally some differences in the tactical approaches suggested by the three countries concerned. Our reporter tried to find out why Warsaw was so cautious about the Lithuanian issue, and why Poland turned back the Soviet military consignment that recently arrived at the Polish-German border, equipment that the Soviet Union wanted to transport home from the territory of the former GDR. [passage omitted].

[Ritecz] Does the Soviet intervention in the Baltics influence Warsaw's standpoint on the withdrawal of Soviet troops?

[Klaczynski] No. In May 1990, we already spoke about the need to withdraw these troops, and in autumn 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki expressed our standpoint on this issue, which has not changed since: The Soviets should pull out of Poland by December 1991!

[Ritecz] What does Moscow think about that? As far as I know, Soviet-Polish talks are to be held soon.

[Klaczynski] That is correct, but the talks will not deal with the time of withdrawal. We have officially declared

31 December, 1991 as the time limit by which the Soviet troops should have withdrawn, but we have received no reply as yet. The talks will deal with the withdrawal of troops, but not with the time of withdrawal. Furthermore, at these talks, we will discuss the transit through Poland of Soviet troops that are withdrawing from German territory.

[Ritecz] In the recent past, Poland has refused to let several Soviet military consignments—returning home from Germany—cross its territory. Why? Rumor has it that the soldiers and the equipment were destined directly for Lithuania, and that this was why Poland would not let them through.

[Klaczynski] We cannot know where these withdrawn units would have been sent. In any case, I think that the Soviet Union has enough soldiers and military technology at home; it does not need to redirect units from Germany to Lithuania. Poland had different reasons for refusing to let these units into the country. The trains and consignments that we stopped looked as though they were being evacuated. We have not yet signed an agreement concerning evacuation conditions from Germany. Given that no conditions had been laid down on paper, we could not allow the military consignments to cross our country.

USSR Troop Withdrawal, Transit Talks Open

LD1102222591 Warsaw PAP in English 2139 GMT
11 Feb 91

[Text] Warsaw, February 11—The two-day and fourth round of Polish-Soviet talks of experts on preparing two agreements: On the principles of withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland and on the conditions of transit from Germany to the USSR through the Polish territory started at the Polish Foreign Ministry here today.

The Polish delegation for the talks is headed by Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry's Department for Europe Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas. The Soviet delegation is headed by Ambassador Ad Personam [as received] Valentin Kopteltsev.

The talks are to end Tuesday afternoon.

Skubiszewski Meets Heads of Withdrawal Talks

LD1202171991 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1500 GMT 12 Feb 91

[Text] Talks are continuing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw between Polish and Soviet experts concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and the transit of forces leaving Germany via Poland. The chairmen of both delegations were today received by Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. The talks are due to end this afternoon.

Joint Soviet Talks Continue on Troop Withdrawal

Issues Under Discussion Listed

LD1202234291 Warsaw PAP in English 2238 GMT
12 Feb 91

[Text] Warsaw, February 12—The fourth round of Polish-Soviet talks at the level of experts on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and conditions of the transit of Soviet troops from the former GDR continued here today.

The talks are planned to end tomorrow. The date of the next round of talks will be agreed upon in the near future.

The talks focused on three documents, including the most difficult one on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

As far as this document is concerned, nearly everything has been agreed upon except for the date. The second document is an extensive protocol supplementing the treaty and regulating all property and financial issues—and as the Polish side plans—legal ones. Negotiations on this document are the least advanced. The third one is an agreement on the transit of Soviet troops from Germany. During the current round of talks we have agreed upon more than a half of its contents, head of the Polish delegation Grzegorz Kotrzewa-Zorbas said.

We believe, that after the next (5th) round of talks the two fundamental documents are agreed upon in such an extent that it will be possible to conclude talks and sign the two documents in a few days after political decisions are made, he added.

Further Progress Noted

LD1302180391 Warsaw PAP in English 1649 GMT
13 Feb 91

[Text] Warsaw, February 13—Debates of three teams of experts ended today the 4th round of Polish-Soviet talks on the principles of withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland and the transit of units from the former GDR. The sides made further progress in formulating detailed decisions, Foreign Ministry press spokesman Wladyslaw Klaczynski told PAP. Both sides decided to hold the next meeting in Moscow in a month or earlier.

Today, the first team of experts dealt with issues of all sorts of transportation and the principles of crossing the border.

The second team reviewed property and financial questions. The most important topic of the talks consists in squaring accounts, primarily for future transit.

The third team, for legal issues, discussed matters of both the status of troops in transit and the necessary changes in the status of troops stationing in Poland till their withdrawal.

Withdrawal Demanded by Year's End

LD1302162691 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1403 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] Warsaw, February 13 (TANJUG)—Warsaw demands that Soviet troops leave Poland by the end of the year. No permission for transit of Soviet troops from Germany will be given before the date was fixed for the withdrawal, Polish Government representatives set out on Wednesday.

Moscow has proposed that the Soviet troops stationed in Poland begin withdrawing in May, but complete the withdrawal as late as mid-1994. The offered explanation was that the units involved should secure the transit of Soviet troops from Germany and Czechoslovakia, as well as because of technical and social difficulties.

In the fourth round of the Soviet-Polish talks on the withdrawal of some 50,000 Soviet troops from Poland and the transit of Soviet troops from Germany, which ended in Warsaw on Wednesday, the Soviet stand on the date of doing away with the bases in Poland was specified for the first time.

Walesa: Soviet Troop Withdrawal Proposal 'Unacceptable'

LD1302182291 Budapest MTI in English 1749 GMT
13 Feb 91

[Excerpts] Warsaw, February 13 (MTI)—The Soviet troops withdrawal and the development of Polish-Hungarian-Czechoslovak co-operation were the two main points emphasized by the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa, in an interview given to correspondents of the Hungarian news agency MTI and the Hungarian radio on Wednesday. [passage omitted]

As regards Gorbachev's letter suggesting the dismantling of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, Walesa expressed his view that problems could not be solved by the use of arms. Military blocs were useless. In an age characterized by open borders, it is economics that solve problems, not arms, he said.

Walesa informed the correspondents that he had told the Soviet charge d'affaires on Tuesday that the Soviet proposal postponing the troops pull-out from Poland to 1994 was unacceptable.

"I understand that the Soviets want their own military to supervise the troops withdrawal from Germany but I can hardly think that they need bases for this in Poland," Walesa said. [passage omitted]

ARGENTINA**Iraq's Involvement in Condor II Project Viewed**

91WC00624 Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish
28 Jan 91 pp 1-4

[Report by Mario Baizan]

[Text] It was in Costa Rica, in September 1989, that Carlos Menem first learned directly of U.S. concern over the Condor II missile. George Bush brought up the issue after their first tennis match, alerting him to the possibility that the Argentine technology in the missile "will wind up in the hands of a dangerous madman like Saddam Husayn."

The issue had previously reached his office through top air force chiefs, who urged the president again and again to visit the Falda del Carmen military aircraft plant in Cordoba and to witness "the last accuracy test" of the "first Argentine missile."

Some hours after George Bush's remark, the president heard another disturbing warning from his foreign minister. In an informal chat with Domingo Cavallo, James Baker himself had suggested that the U.S. president's visit to Argentina, which was beginning to be planned around then, might not come to pass "unless there is a decision beforehand to suspend the Condor II project."

The Menem administration had already ordered the suspension of the contracts under which it was bound to various European companies to sell parts of the missile to Egyptian and German consortiums. A secret decree of 20 July 1990 had dissolved the company in charge of the operation, in spite of which the deal was allegedly still going through. According to sources in Argentine intelligence, "a recently formed consulting firm had begun buying all of the output of the Falda del Carmen plant from the air force in an attempt to keep the deal going."

It was not a small transaction (initially there was talk of selling \$3.2 billion worth of missiles), and perhaps for this very reason the most powerful figures in the Alfonsin administration were enthusiastic about it when the structure of the operation was proposed.

The idea was to develop the Condor II with capital from German and Egyptian companies, presumably triangulating with Iraq, so that it could be exported, after the usual mass production, to "countries with the economic capacity and a political need for this kind of weapon."

Argentine missiles were entering the sophisticated world of remote-controlled weaponry via companies that were in a position to arrange for everything "from financing to direct sales" with the people who are customarily interested in such deals.

According to U.S. and Israeli intelligence reports, the technology reached both Egypt and Iraq and helped to enhance their strategic arsenals.

Between September 1988 and March 1989, Argentina reportedly exported between 12 and 30 Condor-missile airframes to Egypt under contracts authorized by the Alfonsin administration.

U.S. intelligence sources do not believe that the Argentine missile arrived "whole" in Iraq (in other words, with one-hundred percent Argentine parts), but they also assert that the Tamuz I missile, which Saddam Husayn has not yet used in the Gulf war, could be "very similar" to the Condor II. The German company involved in the deal had managed to attach a "smart bomb" with "technology freely available on the international arms market," which would enable the missile to carry conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads as far as 1,000 kilometers and with greater accuracy than the Soviet Scuds.

The top echelon of the Argentine Executive Branch underscores that the Alfonsin administration's decision to become involved in this transaction "is another example of a double-dealing foreign policy that, on the one hand, champions pacifism and, on the other, keeps selling arms to dangerous, antidemocratic regimes." In hushed tones it describes the Alfonsin-Caputo policy as "dangerously ambiguous vis-a-vis the international community."

Nevertheless, when the air force decided to become partners with Egyptian and German firms, arms sales to Iraq were very common in the West because at the time Saddam Husayn looked like "the best constraint" on Khomeyni and his fundamentalist crusade.

The Decrees

On 9 April 1985 the National Executive Branch issued secret decree 604/85 approving the Condor I and Condor II programs as part of an air force branching-out plan.

This decree validated a number of contracts that the Argentine Air Force and the company Tecnologia Aeroespacial S.A. (a "captive" firm of the air force) had signed with Ifat Corporation Ltd. (of the Egyptian Defense Ministry), Desintec S.A., and the German consortium CONSEN.

Under these contracts they agreed to export Condor II technology and raw materials.

In addition, the same decree validated other Defense Ministry resolutions, thus creating a very tight-knit circle of companies that were involved in the project and that were also parties to the transaction; what they supplied ranged from parts to know-how.

The "Condor connection" unleashed a veritable hunting expedition by Israeli intelligence services, which immediately realized the threat that the success of the transaction could pose to the defense of their country.

As in the best spy novels, the pressure redoubled both in Buenos Aires and in Monaco, where the offices of the German consortium that spearheaded the operation were located.

The office manager's car was blown up one morning in late 1987 as a warning.

Some months later, in July 1988, after a patient investigation the FBI arrested Egyptian Colonel Mohammed Abdella Mohammed in Baltimore on charges that he was sending back to Cairo a large wooden box that bore the innocent-sounding label "Air Force Club" but that actually contained "carbon-carbon," a sophisticated petrochemical fuel used in building "smart bombs" on the most advanced missiles.

By that time Washington and Tel Aviv knew that a plant called Factory 17 was—and still is—in operation on the outskirts of Cairo, building the Badr 2000, a Egyptian version of the Condor II.

These countries were also aware (so much so that they revealed the fact through journals specializing in defense issues and through the testimony of noted professors) that Iraq had made headway in building its own missiles after taking receipt of the technology it was buying in Buenos Aires.

In October 1988, the Alfonsin administration got one of its harshest warnings from the White House on this matter. When Horacio Jaunarena visited Washington, both the State Department and the Defense Department, through then Pentagon chief Frank Carlucci, mentioned the Condor II project and suggested to him that "for the good of Argentina's position in the world," testing of the missile should be called off, even though the Alfonsin administration said that it was solely for "peaceful and meteorological purposes."

A Condor for the World

According to information that American intelligence furnished to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT in July 1988, the project on which the Argentine Government had embarked would provide 200 Condor missiles each to Iraq and Egypt.

The same intelligence reports said that Iraq was financing "the entire project," adding that completion of it "would give Argentina a decisive strategic weapon in its confrontation with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands."

Horacio Jaunarena again heard official requests to halt the Condor II project in Tel Aviv in April 1989 while he was on an official visit to Israel, accompanied by Brigadier Crespo, who at the time was the air force chief of staff. Crespo, who was already the main proponent of the project in the Argentine Government, argued to his Israeli hosts that the missile had "peaceful and scientific purposes," but no one believed him. Israeli defense chiefs knew that two tough potential enemies, Egypt and

Iraq, were acquiring the capability to build a missile that posed a serious threat to their cities, and they reportedly went so far as to offer expanded military aid for the Argentine Armed Forces in exchange for an end to the Condor II project.

All of these warnings fell on deaf ears. In designing its foreign policy, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) administration also saw the Argentine missile project as a "message to the powerful up north" that Argentina was determined to "pursue an independent policy."

Moreover, the project represented, among other things an independent source of funds for the air force, and one that would be safe from the vicissitudes of meager budget appropriations, in the effort to overhaul itself. None of the warnings about the ultimate destination of the parts or the technology of the Condor II were heeded by the Radical administration. At best the response was to deny that other governments were applying pressure (because they never used official communications to do so) and to put forth the same argument that the National Committee of the UCR had advanced when Foreign Minister Cavallo brought up the issue before congressional debate: "We have never signed a contract with the Iraqi Government or with Iraqi companies to transfer missile technology." This is true if we consider only the corporate structure that was behind the project and ignore the political connections of the venture.

According to a report from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the following companies were involved in the project:

- The German consortium CONSEN, headquartered in Zug (Switzerland), which is an affiliate of the aerospace firm Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm of Munich, Germany. This company, in turn, is part of the Daimler-Benz holding company of Stuttgart. The group's finance department had secured the financing in Baghdad through its Iraq-based firms.
- The Italian company SNIA, which is linked to the Fiat Group, according to Alan Friedman, an investigative reporter who published his report on the case in THE FINANCIAL TIMES of London.
- The German firm Desintec AG, which provided the raw material for the launch tubes.
- The Italian company R.A.T.A., which supplied the guidance and control equipment.

The residents of Falda del Carmen in Cordoba still remember the monumental construction work on the plant (4,000 workers were involved in "hollowing out" the slope of a mountain so that the plant could be built there) and the "German engineers" who came to work there every morning guarded by special air force contingents.

The accuracy tests of the missile in early 1988 confirmed a range of over 500 kilometers but also uncovered evidence that without a "smart bomb" the missile could hardly compete on the world market.

According to intelligence reports, the decision was then made to move ahead with the manufacture of "part of the missile" with the idea that the factories of "the partners" could complete the assembly of the missing parts.

The pressure that the Israeli services were putting on the project prompted Argentine Air Force intelligence to take "special precautions" more than once to prevent attacks designed to disable the project.

After Carlos Menem took office and in spite of the secret decree ordering the project put on ice, the U.S. and Israeli embassies more than once conveyed their "concerns" to top-level administration officials about "the clandestine export" of Condor Missile parts "to Middle East countries."

No one ever proved anything, but the rumor that was going around among officials in the president's office was that "Arabs who do not even speak Spanish" were boarding planes with "packages of very unusual size" that were not being subjected to the required checks.

The debate on whether to allow the Argentine ships in the Persian Gulf to provide logistic support renewed the argument between Radicals and Peronists on the issue. The administration used it to try and link the Radicals to Saddam Husayn.

When Former Foreign Minister Caputo learned that the Condor II project was being suspended, he demanded that his successor be called to testify before Congress and protested the move at length when Manzano mentioned the "Condor affair" during the debate in the Chamber of Deputies. He then immediately consulted with Raul Alconada Sempe and sent him off to speak with Brigadier Crespo.

Alconada Sempe soon returned with a response, and Caputo offered Crespo's testimony to "prove that Argentina never sold missiles to Iraq."

Meanwhile, the military experts consulted by SOMOS recommend that we monitor Saddam Husayn's missile war "very closely" if we want to find out how far the Condor technology got.

[Box, p 3]

UCR Pressures

The UCR's Raul Alconada Sempe, one of Raul Alfonsin's main operators and a deputy foreign minister in the UCR administration, replied thus to the charges of Domingo Cavallo and other administration officials:

- The only truth to their statements is that the Condor was built during our administration. This business of the financing and the joint project with Iraq is a fabrication.
- It is madness for them to try and put the Alfonsin administration in the dock today, when the only thing it wanted was to develop technology of our own.

- If the German or French companies had ties to the Iraqi Government, that is no longer of concern to us.
- This policy is a gesture of subservience by the Menem administration, which is seeking to establish itself among the developed countries and is agreeing to negotiate anything in return, even if the country's technology is involved.
- Menem is not bearing in mind that in recent years France, Germany, and the United States alike have been selling arms to someone whom they today call their enemy and are now trying to hold us accountable for Husayn's madness.

Ex-Air Force Chief Denies Iraqi Missile Deal

PY0802230691 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1132 GMT 8 Feb 91

[Text] Mendoza, 8 February (NA)—Retired Brigadier Ernesto Crespo, former Air Force chief, has stated here that "the Condor-2 project was never sold to Iraq," and he criticized former Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo for "giving credence to ill-intentioned magazine reports and for not producing serious evidence."

Crespo, who was Air Force chief under the Radical Civic Union government, said Argentina and Egypt were involved in a project "using solid fuel, while Iraq's missiles use liquid fuel."

He said the United States, Germany, and France supplied Iraq, adding that "when dealing with extremely sensitive technology, there are countries which seek to supply those materials and which want to be the absolute authorities on those issues, and the United States is among them."

"In the opinion of those countries, technology, electronics, and vector control cannot be developed by our countries, so we must be limited to serving as suppliers of raw material," Brigadier Crespo told Aconcagua Television.

He said: "Cavallo is mistaken in blaming the previous government for the alleged sale of the Condor. When Alfonsin assumed office, the Condor-1 already existed and the Condor-2 was being developed."

BRAZIL

Role in Improving Iraqi Scud-B Guidance System

Engineers Comment

PY0802011891 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Feb 91 p A 12

[By Mauricio Tuffani]

[Text] Between October 1988 and June 1990, Brazilian technicians indirectly contributed to improving the guidance system of Iraq's Scud-B missiles. The Brazilian

experts' participation was channeled through the Sao Paulo-based ESCA company, for Automation and Control Systems Engineering [Engenharia de Sistemas de Controle e Automacao]. This company provided consulting services for the installation in Baghdad of a simulation laboratory for missile and satellite guidance and control.

In its original version, the Soviet-built Scud-B missile has a maximum range of 270 km. The Iraqis modified it and increased its range to nearly 600 km, making it possible to hit Tel Aviv in Israel and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Its warhead can be a nuclear, conventional, or chemical bomb.

Engineer Descartes de Souza Teixeira, 51, who coordinated the work for ESCA in Iraq, denied that the experts contracted by the company had been consulted by the Iraqis on how to improve the Scud missile. However, one of the experts who participated in the program affirmed that the consulting work allowed experts from the Iraqi Military Industrialization Ministry to obtain the knowledge necessary to improve the guidance system for land-to-land missiles.

"At a consultative meeting with Iraqi military experts, I answered several questions on missile guidance and control. Not only were their questions very unclear as to what they wanted to know, but they were very clear about their lack of knowledge on this matter," said Engineer Decio Castilho Ceballos, 39, head of the Control and Guidance Laboratory of the Space Research Institute (INPE) in Sao Jose dos Campos, 85 km northeast of Sao Paulo.

The INPE expert said his impression of the Iraqi technicians with whom he came in contact was that their training was deficient, even in some basic areas. "I do not believe our consulting work contributed to making the guidance system of the Iraqi version of the Scud missile more precise," Eng. Castilho Ceballos affirmed.

His impression of Iraqi technicians was reinforced by various Brazilian experts who worked on high-tech projects in Iraq. Eng. Rinaldo Baldini, 33, who now works for the Sao Paulo-based Light Metal Control Company and who gave a course on electronics through a contract with Engesa [Specialized Engineers, Inc.], said: "Despite their efforts and dedication, the Iraqi technicians needed 'full-time' tutoring."

Eng. Descartes de Souza Teixeira refused to reveal the names of Brazilian experts who worked for ESCA in Iraq. He also refused to give the number of experts who were contracted by the company for the installation of the laboratory, saying: "That is restricted information."

Retired Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira Piva, 64, president of the HOP consulting firm in Sao Jose dos Campos, said he does not believe Iraq has succeeded in establishing a guidance and control simulation laboratory. HOP's experts have been in Iraq working on developing technology for the air-to-air Piranha missile. Piva affirmed that the simulation tests would have had to have been conducted in Brazil to carry the development work further.

Other Countries Involved in Training Iraqis

PY0702234491 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Feb 91 p A 12

[Local report by "MT"]

[Text] The training of the Iraqi military in missile guidance systems was not carried out only by Brazilian technicians. The Space Research Center consultation meetings in Baghdad also counted on the participation of specialists from the United States, France, England, China, Germany, and the USSR.

Engineer Decio Ceballos believes that his participation and that of other Brazilian technicians was a significant factor in improving the guidance system of the Scud-B. "I learned through the Iraqis themselves that they had had several similar meetings with specialists from other countries. Also, we Brazilians were a minority among the foreign technicians in Iraq," Ceballos said.

A high level of development in aerospace technology is not necessary to increase the range of a missile. It can be done through the use of a better quality fuel than the one being used. Another alternative which can be used with the previous one is to reduce the payload carried by the missile warhead. This was the method used by the Iraqis, according to evaluations made by analysts from several countries and reported by international press agencies.

French President Francois Mitterrand denied last month that the French enterprise Sagem had sold missile guidance equipment to Iraq. In its latest issue, the French magazine L'EXPRESS accused the Argentine enterprise Intesa of passing Sagem components to Iraq.

EGYPT

Warning Against Use of Unconventional Arms in Gulf

NC0602033791 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0057 GMT 6 Feb 91

[Text] Cairo, 5 February (MENA)—The newspaper AL-AHRAM has expressed regret over statements by parties to the Gulf war concerning the possibility of using unconventional weapons against the adversary. Iraq is implying it will use chemical weapons, and the allied nations respond by stating they may use nuclear weapons.

In an editorial tomorrow, Wednesday, the newspaper warns the parties to the war that resorting to unconventional weapons will not affect just the troops on the ground; the consequences of the use of such weapons will extend to civilians and the environment. This, the paper warns, will have disastrous effects on the region and its inhabitants long after the war is over.

The paper hopes that the Iraqi leaders will bear in mind the grave situation experienced by the region since the occupation of Kuwait and that they will not commit further crimes against the region and its future. This can be done by refraining from using unconventional weapons so as not to provide the multinational forces with a pretext to use nuclear weapons, the paper notes.

The paper hopes that Iraq's leaders will remember the disasters threatening the region and pan-Arab security. The paper explains this can be done by withdrawing from Kuwait under any excuse or pretext so as to enable the Arab states to move and exert pressure to halt the fighting. This will safeguard what remains of Iraq's military capabilities and protect pan-Arab security from the forces seeking to undermine it.

INDIA

Prithvi Medium-Range Missile Successfully Tested

BK1102160391 Delhi Domestic Service in English 1530 GMT 11 Feb 91

[Text] The third test firing of India's indigenously built surface-to-surface medium range missile, Prithvi [Earth], was successfully conducted today from the Sriharikota Range in Andhra Pradesh. The missile is designed to perform the tactical battlefield support role. It will function with a high accuracy system to destroy various types of military targets behind the forward line of the battlefield.

Prime Minister Opposes Chemical, Nuclear Weapons Use in Gulf

BK1102092791 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0830 GMT 11 Feb 91

[Text] The prime minister has expressed concern over the threat of use of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Gulf. Mr. Chandra Shekhar said if this happens, it will have an adverse impact on the environment in the region. He was inaugurating an Asian workshop on the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program [IGBP] in New Delhi today. The prime minister hoped that the leaders involved in the Gulf war will exercise restraint and refrain from using such weapons.

He called upon the scientists to help reorient development strategies to steer the world away from the adverse impacts of global environmental changes. The IGBP is a research effort directed at acquiring fundamental inside of the global systems which will help assess changes in the planet over the next 100 years.

Prime Minister Cautions U.S. on Nuclear, Chemical Weapons Use

BK1202160091 Delhi Domestic Service in English 1530 GMT 12 Feb 91

[Text] The prime minister, Mr. Chandra Shekhar, has cautioned the United States and its allies against the use of nuclear or chemical weapons in the Gulf war. He said that it will be a misadventure and will go against the UN Charter. In an informal chat with newsmen at the conclusion of the two-day session of the National Youth Council in New Delhi today, he said such threats are fraught with grave danger to the entire humanity.

Asked whether the country will review its nuclear policy as suggested by the Congress-I president, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, in the event of the United States using nuclear weapons, he said the country will be ready to meet any situation and the government will take steps accordingly.

IRAN

Paper: U.S. May Have Used Chemical Weapons

NC1402135791 Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Feb 91 p 2

[Editorial: "New U.S. Schemes"]

[Text] The Persian Gulf seems to be heading for a deadlock despite the barbaric massacre of the innocent people of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies. After all these atrocities, the West is gradually realizing, though bitterly, that its initial calculations were wrong. With Iraq's war machine being demolished, the West's also has been stuck aground.

The U.S. statesmen and the Pentagon are reluctant even to keep their allies informed about the details of the war. By restricting the scope of the information released, the

Americans are trying to maintain the initiative in the decision-making. Evidences show that Washington is gradually being persuaded that there are slim chances of winning the war by conventional and even sophisticated weapons and for this very reason the whispers of resorting to banned arms for mass killings are being heard.

This is a very sensitive and dangerous situation to the extent that the contemporary world and even Washington's allies too, should feel responsible for the present and future developments. They have been dragged into this whirlpool by the U.S. but the question is whether it is advisable for them to drown together with Washington in this vortex?

In the same way that the war was avoidable and the dispute could have been settled by other peaceful means, today the U.S. is trying to block all avenues except for the one favored by itself, thus pushing the course of events into an irreversible direction.

Washington is highly intimidated over the prolongation of the war and the consequences and repercussions of a war of attrition and is therefore preparing the psychological-propaganda grounds for employment of the banned weapons with the hope that they would be effective. Though malicious but [as published] this propaganda ploy reveals the Washington officials' desperation and hints that they planning to use more destructive weapons as they seem to be disappointed with their present tactics.

There are also indications that they might have already used such weapons, though to a limited extent against Iraq, while attributing the effects of spread of poison gases to the explosion of that country's chemical depots. If true, this method could be adopted to provoke Baghdad to take out its chemical and probably bacteriological weapons in order that they would be able to justify a retaliation in kind.

In parallel with such cunning propaganda, certain disappointed governments as the one in London are cherishing new plans on the future of the region and particularly the hands of the U.S. and Britain should be cut off from the region. The root cause of the crisis and all other crises in contemporary history should be searched in the wickedness of Britain and the U.S. and in the subservience of certain governments to foreigners. There is no doubt that Britain and its American masters are impudent enough to try to assume a role in determining the future of the region.

The Muslim community and the regional nations have sustained deadly blows from those treacheries, machinations and quislings, the most notable one being the creation of the cancerous non-entity of Israel in the heart of the region. But they have reached the conclusion that the U.S. and Britain are their real enemies. At the end of the current crisis, it is nations who should take action to assert determining their own destiny.

IRAQ

'Enemies' Talk of Chemical Capability Reported

JN0802130091 Baghdad *AL-QADISIYAH* in Arabic
6 Feb 91 p 7

[News analysis: "The Enemies Are Intensifying Their Talk About Iraq's Chemical Capabilities"]

[Text] Political observers and analysts have noticed that the American and British administrations are intensifying their talk about Iraq's capabilities in the field of chemical weapons and warheads.

Sometimes, they talk about a "possibility" expressed and propagated by the two administrations along with the Zionist entity. What they are talking about is the "possibility" of Iraq's employment of weapons of mass destruction. At other times, they talk about Iraq's possession of these weapons and warheads and its ability to use them by means of missiles or other weapons.

Political observers and analysts have concluded that the reason American, British, and Israeli officials; namely, Cheney, Tom King, and the Israeli Government, are intensifying this type of dialogue is to give them an excuse to take revenge against Iraq by using their weapons of mass destruction.

These observers and analysts also concluded from their reading of these threats and current propagation of the "possibility" of Iraq using these weapons that these threats imply "exaggerations that conceal something" in addition to covering up their failure to harm Iraq's military capabilities in their more than 20-day long aggression.

In this regard, observers wonder about the justifications for intensifying this recent talk, although Iraq has repeatedly affirmed that it would fight the aggressors with the same weapons as those used by the enemies.

However, what the West fears is the size of the Iraqi retaliation. In this context, we can understand the BBC's reference to the overwhelming anxiety in the West, which does not know for sure Iraq's capability of launching missiles carrying chemical warheads, the size and nature of its chemical capabilities, and the possibility of employing them in the various weapons it possesses.

Use of Longer Range Missile Threatened

NC0702123791 Paris AFP in English 1226 GMT
7 Feb 91

[Text] Baghdad, February 7 (AFP)—Iraq threatened Thursday to use its al-'Abbas missile, with a range 50 per cent greater than the Scud, to strike Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The Voice of the Masses, an Iraqi radio station, said "the al-'Abbas missiles are ready to reply to the enemies of Iraq if they continue their aggression."

The al-'Abbas, with a range of 900 to 950 kilometers (562 to 593 miles), is an enhanced version of the surface-to-surface Scud, which has a range of up to 600 kms (375 miles).

Deputy Premier Threatens Use of 'Unconventional Arms'

*AB1302231191 Paris AFP in French 2148 GMT
13 Feb 91*

[Text] Nouakchott, 13 February (AFP)—If the allied forces use nuclear weapons, Iraq will retort with unconventional arms, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, Sa'dun Hammadi, said today in the Mauritanian capital.

"We do not have nuclear arms, but if we are attacked with this weapon, we will use all the unconventional arms we possess," Mr. Hammadi stated at a news conference today in Nouakchott after a meeting of over one hour with the Mauritanian head of state, Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya. He indicated that the weapons used so far by the allied forces are conventional arms. He admitted, however, that these arms are "highly sophisticated and destructive."

The Iraqi deputy prime minister said he was "very satisfied" with his talks with the Mauritanian leader and later called for "the expansion of the popular struggle to all Arab countries and the removal of any obstacles that might block its way." He called "on all Arab and Muslim countries to reject all decisions made by the Security Council on the Gulf" and, finally, for "a break in diplomatic, political, and economic relations with the international coalition countries by Arab countries."

Questioned on the postwar situation in the Arab World, the Iraqi envoy stated: "We must immediately call for a more equitable redistribution of Arab wealth among Arab countries and Muslims." Mr. Hammadi also felt that "the world is becoming a plaything in the hands of the Americans since the balance of power regulating it has collapsed," adding that some countries like the Soviet Union have begun to see the danger.

He accused the international coalition of wanting to destroy Iraq, its people, and its civil infrastructure, adding that thousands of Iraqi civilians have already died during the bombings and that a lot of the country's infrastructure has been destroyed. "We have not as yet evaluated the exact extent of the damage, but all the same, it is very extensive and civilian deaths can be counted in the thousands on our side," said Mr. Hammadi in reply to a question on the toll of victims and extent of the damage.

Finally, to a question on the outcome of the war, Mr. Hammadi said: "We have always expressed our desire to negotiate and arrive at a peaceful solution. They chose

war. In both cases, they will find that Iraq is ready both for peace and for war; and in both cases, we are certain of victory."

Immediately after his press conference, Hammadi (who arrived this afternoon in the Mauritanian capital) left Nouakchott early this evening for Sudan, the next leg of a tour of Arab countries that do not form part of the anti-Iraqi coalition.

ISRAEL

Proof of German Chemical Sales to Iraq Sought

TA0602144391 Jerusalem Voice of Israel and IDF Radio Network in Hebrew 1400 GMT 6 Feb 91

[Text] The German ambassador to Israel said today that for years, and until this day, Israeli defense elements have been relaying to Bonn information and proof on factories that illegally sold chemical substances and other weapons to Iraq. The information was relayed in order to allow the prosecution of German companies. He added that some of the information was in reply to requests by the German Government, but it was not always sufficient to press charges, because German law demands that very detailed proof be presented in such cases.

Our correspondent Mor Suliman reports that Ambassador Otto von der Gablentz was speaking before the Bnai Brith organization members in Jerusalem. He said that, even today, the Israeli and German Governments are still honestly interested in finding proof and punishing guilty companies.

SUDAN

Reports on Iraqi Missiles Called 'Fabricated'

*AB0502165291 Paris AFP in French 1608 GMT
5 Feb 91*

[Text] Khartoum, 5 February (AFP)—Sudan today denied the installation of Iraqi missiles and military aircraft on its territory and described as "fabricated" press reports published on the issue. Quoted by the Sudanese agency SUNA, Mr. 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad, minister of information and spokesman of the Sudanese Government, pointed out that he was not "surprised to hear such lies from foreign intelligence agents who infiltrated our country under the pretext of carrying out humanitarian missions."

The American ABC television said yesterday—quoting European and Sudanese military and diplomatic sources as well as officials of international humanitarian organizations operating in Sudan—that Iraq has installed surface-to-surface missiles and fighters at several locations in Sudan.

The minister accused representatives of these humanitarian organizations of aiming to "distort the internal and foreign policy of Sudan and other Arab and Islamic

countries which have adopted independent stands vis-a-vis the Gulf war." He also warned foreign diplomats in Sudan and called on them to ensure that their reports were accurate and to verify their sources, whether these were Sudanese or humanitarian, because, he said, such reports could compromise "their diplomatic competence as well as the interests of their countries."

Minister Denies Iraqi Missiles Targetting Egypt
*EA0702125091 Khartoum SUNA in English 0919 GMT
7 Feb 91*

[Text] Khartoum, 7 February (SUNA)—Information Minister 'Abdallah Ahmad [name and title as received] dismissed a charge by some Western mass media on the presence of Iraqi missiles and fighter planes in Sudan targetting the High Dam in Egypt. The official government spokesman said in a telephone interview by Jordanian journalists yesterday that the evil idea behind this fabricated report is aimed at driving a wedge between the Arab people in Sudan and Egypt as the High Dam is vital for the Egyptian economy. Fortunately our Egyptian brothers are aware enough to deprive our colonialist enemies such opportunity.

He wonders how it could have been possible for an anonymous relief agent, to whom the report was attributed, to know such top secret military matters. Secondly, the minister went on to say, how could Sudan and Iraq have been able to receive the great number of American spy satellites that are roving in space over the Middle East.

The minister concluded that the report was a foolish idea picked up by foolish Western diplomats from a crazy relief agent. Ahmad, in the interview, reiterated Sudan's unshakeable stance towards what is going on in the Gulf area.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

U.S. 'Threat' To Use Chemical Weapons Viewed
*EA1002172391 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic
1800 GMT 9 Feb 91*

[Ahmed Fad'aq commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, the latest threat about the possibility of using nuclear [as heard] weapons against Iraq was made by the U.S. envoy to the disarmament conference in Geneva. He said that his country did not rule out the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war if Iraq

resorted to them first. This threat [word indistinct] the fears shown by the peoples of the region that the United States might embark on this savage action. This statement confirmed statements made earlier by U.S. civilian and military officials, including Dick Cheney, the U.S. defense secretary, and before him Quayle, the U.S. vice president.

These announcements disappoint people and countries, and deepen their concern. These announcements, which in essence constitute arrogance and [word indistinct], confirm to what extent the United States shows its lack of concern for international law and the dignity of nations, as well as disrespect for the lives of millions of human beings.

There is compelling evidence to make people believe in the seriousness of U.S. intentions, when they look at the destructive weapons delivered by U.S. and allied forces on Iraq and the resultant destruction of civil installations, houses, residential areas, and establishments, as well as the killing of hundreds of civilians.

Military observers have estimated that the quantity of bombs and rockets that have been dropped on Iraq far exceed the volume and strength of the two U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two Japanese towns, in World War II. In spite of the fact that these estimates may be right, the Iraqi people have succeeded in standing steadfastly against the weapons of destruction and death and continue their resistance to aggression. This has thrown the United States, and Britain in particular, as well as their allies, into confusion. This has impelled U.S. civil and military officials to hint at the use of chemical weapons.

Surely everybody must be convinced that this U.S. stand constitutes a threat to human life and international security, because it comes from a superpower which is already using its great might against a small developing country like Iraq. It is not hesitating to destroy it and annihilate the landmarks of its existence. It is a paradox that the United States voices this threat at a time when it pretends to the world that it is concerned about international peace and law and is working for the establishment of law and order and the protection of human life.

Nobody can be convinced about the credibility of the announced U.S. stands, whether in the United Nations or official statements, as long as threats to use nuclear weapons against Iraq are made every now and then, thus placing the peoples of the Arab nation in a state of expectation of receiving strikes from weapons of destruction and annihilation.

GENERAL**Program Notes Satellite Arms Control Monitoring**

PM1502170991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0330 GMT 14 Feb 91

[From the "Utro 120 + 30" program: Report by A. Gerasimov]

[Text] [Gerasimov] In recent years in our country, ravaged by economic and domestic policy problems, space research has, putting it mildly, become a dirty word. In view of the empty stores and lack of confidence in the future, the mere mention of space research causes irritation to some people. However, in the heat of the space nihilism, one aspect of the space program, and probably one of the most important aspects, is being forgotten. I am referring to national and international security. If, at the philistine level, the Soviet space program provokes dissatisfaction because of the absence of immediate returns, it should be remembered that international stability is the most immediate return gained from space research.

[V. Smolin, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Evaluation and Planning Administration] First, compliance with most of the agreements that have been concluded in the arms control sphere is monitored from space. Second, observation from space can be a very important confidence-building measure providing reassurance that there will be no surprise attack. And third, knowledge of partners is very important in ridding states of excessive fear.

The events in the Persian Gulf are being observed from space, and being observed very closely, and the information gathered in this way is very important to the overall evaluation of the situation. This is certainly important for the countries directly involved in the conflict, but in my opinion it is also very important for the entire international community. The point is that this military conflict is probably the first in which a deliberate attempt has been made to influence the ecological situation. A global threat has arisen. And it is of great importance to the entire international community to know the scale of this catastrophe and to mobilize forces to prevent its further expansion.

[Gerasimov] A simple job in orbit—the filming by television camera of the area of combat operations has already enabled the whole world to appreciate the scale of the catastrophe in the Persian Gulf.

Incidentally, our country is the only one among the space powers capable of regularly obtaining video information from space.

START TALKS**Churkin: START Dialogue 'Developing Constructively'**

LD0602154491 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 6 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, February 6 (TASS)—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov together with a group of strategic arms limitation experts from the Soviet Defence Ministry and other departments left for Geneva today on a commission from Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and in accordance with an arrangement made during his recent talks in Washington, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today.

The work on a strategic arms reduction treaty, he said, is in the concluding stage, and the task now is to settle a small number of matters, which could help implement the "Houston package" (the formula found in December 1990 at the talks in Houston on such complex technical aspects as limits on the throw-weight of ballistic missiles, heavy bombers arms control, a continuous monitoring of facilities for the production of mobile ICBMs, and some other matters).

"According to evaluations by Soviet participants in the consultations, the dialogue with U.S. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew and his team is developing constructively," Churkin said.

At the end of January Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and the U.S. leadership agreed that the work on the text of a START treaty could be completed within February, Churkin said.

"This is a firm guide for our negotiators and, we hope, for U.S. ones as well," Churkin emphasised.

Obukhov Sees START Treaty Talks on 'Homestretch'

PM0602170491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Obukhov by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "On the Homestretch"]

[Text] On the instructions of USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh, on 6 February his deputy A.A. Obukhov, who is in charge of relations with the United States and Canada, set off for Geneva. He is accompanied by a group of eminent experts in the sphere of strategic offensive arms limitation from the USSR Defense Ministry and other departments. Our correspondent asked A.A. Obukhov to tell us about the aims of the trip.

[PRAVDA] What gave rise to the need for this new effort within the framework of the talks process between the USSR and the United States?

[Obukhov] The Soviet-U.S. talks on radically reducing strategic offensive arms, which have been in progress in their present form since 1985, have long since entered the concluding phase. All the most complex questions of principle have been resolved. That can be stated firmly.

In the process of settling the central aspects of the future treaty—the total levels of reductions stipulated, the composition of the systems subject to reductions, the ruling out of attempts to bypass the treaty—an invaluable role was, of course, played by accords reached at a political level. I am talking about the contacts between the top Soviet and U.S. leaders, and also meetings between foreign ministers. In their totality they make up the main motive force in the talks process. In this connection you only have to recall Reykjavik, Washington-87, and Washington-90, when, in particular, the outlines of subsequent talks on nuclear and space arms and on the further strengthening of strategic stability were agreed in principle.

However, even the homestretch at the talks turned out not to be easy. It is well known that by the end of 1988 the delegations had at their disposal joint drafts of the texts of the treaty itself and of a number of other, related documents. Even after this, however, a series of intensive meetings at ministerial level was still led in order to finalize such important questions as, for instance, limitations on long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The delegations in Geneva worked on the basis of these accords, resolving as they went along a large number of problems of a purely technical nature.

By the end of last year it became clear that in order to give additional impetus to the talks it would be expedient to bring in the relevant deputy foreign ministers on each side, together with experts, to settle the remaining problems.

[PRAVDA] Meetings between deputy ministers took place in December last year in Washington and Houston, and then in Washington again in January. What were the results?

[Obukhov] I must point out that these meetings were held by way of preparation for talks at ministerial level. I can hardly give an assessment of my own work, but all the same I will venture to say that highly detailed discussions, with the participation of specialists, of many very complicated points of a technical nature enabled us to arrive at an agreement on questions that until recently were obstacles to an accord. What am I referring to, specifically? This includes questions of limiting the throw-weight of ballistic missiles, verification of the armaments of heavy bombers, continuous surveillance of facilities for the production of mobile ICBM's, and a number of other questions. These all formed part of the so-called "Houston package." I think its implementation (and within the framework of this "package," very few

questions remain to be finally agreed) would be a major breakthrough in the final section of the talks.

[PRAVDA] How do you assess the time frame for the work that remains?

[Obukhov] As a result of talks between USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh and the U.S. leadership at the end of January, a mutual understanding was reached that work on the text of the treaty could be completed during February. For me, that is a firm directive.

[PRAVDA] How do you assess the partners' position at the talks?

[Obukhov] Dialogue with U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew is developing constructively. Of course, differences of views are emerging. But the object of talks is to find a mutually acceptable compromise. I emphasize—mutually acceptable. Here, as before, we act on the basis of the positions formulated in Moscow on a collective basis by the relevant departments, including the USSR Defense Ministry.

Personally, let me say that it is a great honor for me to participate in the work of completing the preparation of the strategic offensive weapons treaty, which will be a milestone in the struggle for real disarmament. I hope to make use of my experience in the drafting of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, in whose conclusion I also had some involvement, as well as my experience of earlier direct participation in talks on strategic offensive weapons.

Legislators Discuss Visit to Geneva Talks

PM1502115991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with academician V. Afanasyev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, and Colonel V. Ochirov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Questions, by V. Izgarshev; place and date not given, first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction: "A Treaty for Which Everyone Is Waiting"]

[Text] They returned from Geneva a few days ago. Representatives of two USSR Supreme Soviet committees, academician V. Afanasyev of the International Affairs Committee and Colonel V. Ochirov of the Committee for Defense and Security Questions, familiarized themselves in Geneva with the progress of talks between the USSR and the United States on the preparation of the strategic offensive arms treaty. They are talking to us today.

[Izgarshev] This treaty, which people of goodwill are hoping will be signed soon, has been described as the agreement of the century.

[Afanasyev] The agreement that is being prepared is indeed unprecedented. It will make it possible for the first time not just to considerably lower the level of

nuclear confrontation between the two countries, but also to substantially reduce the arsenals of these awesome weapons.

[Izgarshev] This was your second trip to the talks. Last November you already met with their participants, both ours and the Americans. I recall your account of the first trip. It was entirely optimistic. You wrote then that the treaty would be ready for signing in time for the Moscow summit which was scheduled for February this year.

[Afanasyev] My opinion has not changed even now, and I believe that Valeriy Nikolayevich [Ochirov] shares it too. Admittedly, the summit has been postponed, it has been rescheduled. But I see no obstacles to the signing of the agreement.

[Ochirov] In any event, as we were told by both our and the American side, it could be signed as early as March.

[Izgarshev] Could you tell us about your work in Geneva.

[Afanasyev] We did not set out to get to know absolutely everything. That would be impossible. The treaty with its tens of statements, protocols, appendices, memoranda, and so forth is extremely bulky, it is a folio which runs into many pages. We sought to gain a deeper understanding of the political aspect of the documents and to elaborate political assessments of the draft treaty. To this end we met with our delegation in its full composition, and with groups and individual members of the delegation. Naturally, we also met with the Americans.

[Ochirov] Furthermore, we met with Swiss parliamentarians. They also expressed the deep conviction that the whole planet is looking to the two nuclear superpowers' Geneva talks with hope and faith.

[Izgarshev] The upcoming 50-percent reduction of the most fearsome lethal potential inspires hope...

[Afanasyev] Yes, of course. Although, as we have established, the strategic offensive arms ceiling laid down by the treaty—1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads—does not correspond to a 50-percent reduction, and will be somewhat lower. The point is that calculations pertaining to strategic nuclear forces are very complex and contradictory and do not lend themselves to ordinary arithmetic.

[Izgarshev] Just to give us an idea, who is cutting more, us or them?

[Ochirov] In terms of missiles, it is probably us, and in terms of warheads, it is them. The main question, which we also asked ourselves while we were acquainting ourselves with the progress of the talks, is the question to what extent the strategic offensive arms treaty reduces the nuclear threat, and what impact it has on our security. You will ask what conclusion we have reached. You see, from a purely military viewpoint the treaty unfortunately does not eliminate the nuclear danger. The ceiling for strategic nuclear forces which it lays down—the 1,600 and 6,000—is, alas, still fraught with considerable

danger. This number of missiles and their warheads is capable of destroying many times over not just the population of our two countries but also mankind as a whole, should war break out.

[Afanasyev] However, the merit of the treaty lies in the fact that it not only substantially reduces the nuclear arsenals but also puts a real barrier in the path of the arms race in the shape of numerous restrictions and prohibitions.

[Izgarshev] What, in your opinion, will be the situation as regards the vulnerability threshold after the signing of the treaty? In other words, will we not find ourselves in the hopeless position of a routed power in the event of a nuclear attack?

[Afanasyev] The treaty does not do any damage to our country's security. We are 100-percent convinced of this, as the saying goes. After all, we retain the strike nucleus of our strategic forces—the heavy ICBMs, and also mobile missiles on railroad flatcars and trucks.

[Ochirov] Incidentally the war in the Persian Gulf zone has shown that mobile missiles are relatively safe from air strikes.

[Izgarshev] Two months separate your trips to Geneva. What has changed at the talks during this time?

[Afanasyev] They have moved far ahead, and the sides, as mentioned earlier, will be ready in the near future to submit their work to the leaders of their powers for signing. Many controversial problems have been resolved during the two months. However, there are questions which remain to be resolved. What are they? First, the question of telemetry, of the methods of transmitting information from missiles while they are being tested. Essentially, this is a purely technical question. Second, the question of continuous monitoring [kontrol] of the production of our mobile missiles. As a result of our protracted efforts we are finally arriving at an agreement on monitoring each side's plants on a parity basis.

[Ochirov] Important advances have been achieved in the limitation of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. They are, as is known, the Americans' trump card.

[Izgarshev] This type of cruise missile is not the subject of the talks at this stage.

[Ochirov] Nonetheless, an accord has been reached that the number of such missiles should be limited to 880 on either side.

[Afanasyev] We also regard as a great achievement the accord on the criterion for the range of sea-launched cruise missiles—up to 600 km.

[Ochirov] The same range limit—up to 600 km—is also envisaged in the treaty for air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's). The United States was insisting on a range of up to 1,500 km. Our side did not agree to this as it would

mean restructuring the air defense system, entailing colossal new expenditure. Substantial accords have been reached on air-launched missiles: The number of heavy bombers and warheads [boyezaryad] have been limited.

[Izgarshev] Frankly speaking, do you personally like everything in the new treaty? Do you find all its provisions to your satisfaction?

[Afanashev] Probably no one would answer this in the affirmative. The point is that negotiations are a quest for mutually advantageous solutions of disputed problems, but also a result of compromises and mutual concessions by the sides. For example, we gave way to the United States on verification [kontrol] of the latest strategic B-2 bomber ("Stealth"). At present it is undergoing flight tests. But we have agreed that should just one nuclear ALCM be launched from it, the aircraft will automatically become subject to verification by us.

[Ochirov] At the same time we have come to an agreement on our Tu-95's and the missiles with which they are equipped.

[Afanashev] To cite another negotiation situation: Back in Reykjavik we agreed to count a heavy bomber which does not carry long-range missiles as one delivery vehicle and one warhead. Although it is obvious to everyone that such an aircraft can carry several warheads, both nuclear and conventional.

[Ochirov] However, even here prohibitions have now been introduced. Heavy bombers cannot be based outside the national territory, and in the event of their redeployment necessitated by specific circumstances, the sides are obliged to notify each other.

[Izgarshev] In respect of heavy bombers equipped with long-range nuclear cruise missiles a quota of 180 has been laid down for us, against an American quota of 150. Why is this?

[Ochirov] The U.S. heavy bombers carry more cruise missiles. They carry up to 20, against our 16. This 20-percent difference is compensated for by a corresponding increase in the number of our aircraft.

[Afanashev] The treaty does not ban the modernization of strategic offensive arms and consequently it does not promote the ending of nuclear tests. This is its "weak" point. However, the treaty does incorporate a ban on the development of new types of heavy ICBMs.

[Ochirov] As is known, the Americans are afraid of our heavy missiles, half of which we retain after the reduction. Their throw-weight is considerably greater than that of the heaviest U.S. missiles.

[Izgarshev] It seems to me that the central component of our country's security, just like that of our partners, is mutual vulnerability to a retaliatory nuclear strike. It is this which presupposes an organic link between the strategic offensive arms treaty and the ABM Treaty, does it not?

[Afanashev] You are right. But in my opinion it is precisely this link which does not suit the Americans. Metaphorically speaking, they would like our country to have a wide-open "window" of vulnerability, while their country has at worst only a narrow "air-vent."

[Ochirov] To this end they have developed the SDI program and are implementing it. Despite all their assurances that SDI is a defensive system, the facts testify that from its very conception it has been an offensive system. Its objective is to change the strategic balance [sootnosheniye] in favor of the United States.

[Afanashev] However the path of the implementation of SDI is barred by the ABM Treaty. So the task is to preserve this treaty, without altering its original interpretation under any circumstances. The point is that the Americans do not want to recognize any link between the ABM Treaty which is in force and the strategic offensive arms treaty which is in preparation. They do not talk directly about withdrawing from ABM (as is known, the Senate and Congress are opposed to this), but the desire to sidestep this treaty, or give it a new interpretation that would favor them, is there. And therefore, it seems to me, we must let it be known that should the United States withdraw from the ABM Treaty, we will withdraw from the strategic offensive arms treaty.

[Izgarshev] But the task today is to conclude the strategic offensive arms treaty in the very near future.

[Afanashev] Yes, of course. It is needed by both sides and the whole world. And to put off its conclusion, to postpone the summit on various pretexts is against the interests of the peoples of all continents, not just of our two countries.

[Ochirov] Irrespective of all the remaining unresolved questions in the strategic offensive arms sphere, the treaty as a whole is an epoch-making event.

[Izgarshev] In what do you see its epoch-making significance?

[Ochirov] You have already mentioned that from the military-strategic aspect it not only sharply lowers the level of nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers and strengthens strategic stability, but also opens up the prospect of a nuclear-free world. As for its foreign policy aspect—it raises the mutual relations between our countries to a new level of trust and eases the international climate.

[Afanashev] I would also like to mention the international law aspect. The treaty is very complex and very significant; as yet it has no parallel in international law. After all, it regulates a most complex system, the system of strategic weapons.

The treaty also takes account of the current international situation and of economic, political, and many other factors. It brings into practice new forms of verification [kontrol], making provision for 13 types of different

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kinds of inspection, for example. The terminology glossary alone contains 180 entries. And all the documents together run to some 700 pages.

How can one omit to express here once again appreciation to our diplomats, specialists, and experts, in short everyone who for many years has responsibly and competently done this difficult work. They have worked hard for the benefit of the fatherland. Incidentally, the American contribution must not be belittled either.

[Ochirov] I would like to say in conclusion that under no circumstances must we drag our feet as regards the signing of the treaty. Neither the Persian Gulf nor the Baltic republics can or should be allowed to present an obstacle, despite some people's efforts to link the events in these regions with the conclusion of the agreement.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Kraskovskiy on Early-Warning Radar System's Importance

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[Interview with Col. Gen. Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy by Maj. A. Babakin under "Theory and Practice" rubric: "The Country's Security and Localistic Egoism: the Truth and Conjectures About Superradars"]

[Text:] Today there is much dispute about questions in the reform of the armed forces and their optimum reduction. But how can one determine precisely what quantity of arms needs to be reduced so that our defense does not suffer? For decades, for example, a veil of secrecy shrouded the activities of the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS). Only a limited number of people had information on the purposes for which the extremely complicated radar complexes costing hundreds of millions of rubles were built. During the time of the "cold war," of course, such secrecy was quite justified. But individual leaders of some nationalistic and informal movements that are striving to earn for themselves political capital and authority through anti-army criticism did not hesitate to utilize the lack of full information on BMEWS. Under their leadership, there was an open attack against important defense facilities in the press and at mass meetings in some regions of the country. And the people, not understanding what kind of structures are found on their land, responded to the demagogic appeals and demands that they be closed. As a result, the construction of a radar facility in the region of the city of Mukachevo was frozen: the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet unilaterally declared a moratorium on the building of superpower radars anywhere in the territory of the Ukraine. Appeals are also being issued in other republics to eliminate analogous radar stations.

But will our state be able to get along without them at this time? What is the effect of radar stations on people and

the environment? How will their elimination affect national security? The conversation of the journal's correspondent, Maj. A. Babakin, with Col. Gen. Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy was about this and other problems having to do with the situation in the country with respect to the ballistic missile early warning system.

[Babakin] Volter Makarovich, there probably are not many people in the Soviet Union who know that we have ballistic missile early warning systems. Could you tell us about them briefly?

[Kraskovskiy] In the early 1960's in the United States, they began the massive deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. So as not to permit a sudden attack with such a powerful weapon that would be fatal to our country, new arms systems were built—systems for warning against missile attack, antiballistic-missile defense, and the monitoring of space. The forces equipped with these systems became part of the country's air defense.

In the first stage, the ballistic missile early warning system had to detect the missile attack and provide information to the corresponding command centers for the making of a decision on counteractions. It was subsequently necessary to assess the scale of the strike and its intended targets and to determine the regions for the launching of missiles. In accordance with these tasks, primary attention in all stages of the establishment of the BMEWS was paid to the formation of a grouping of systems permitting the detection of missiles in all dangerous sectors and ensuring a high degree of reliability of the information being provided. For this purpose, it was necessary to have warning systems (meaning radar stations) capable of detecting ballistic missiles from a maximum distance immediately after launch. The places where such radar facilities are deployed have already been named in our press. They are Pechora, Murmansk, Mingechaur, Balkhash, and Irkutsk. If one looks at a map of the USSR and gets an approximate overview of these systems, then it turns out that they constitute a continuous radar field. This field has a small breach in the northeast sector, which the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station was supposed to close.

[Babakin] The story of this station was covered rather extensively in our press....

[Kraskovskiy] Quite right. Moreover the intensive conquering of space and the putting into orbit of artificial satellites for military purposes made it necessary to monitor them continuously as well. The primary mission of the system for the monitoring of space is to know the status of the objects in space. It operates not only for military purposes but also resolves important national tasks. The forces are equipped with expensive science-intensive complexes that operate automatically or semi-automatically. Without harming their performance of direct functions, logically maximum use should be made of such complexes (and certainly this position will be

further developed in the scope of military reform) in the interests of the improvement of the combat possibilities of other systems.

[Babakin] Can you elucidate this idea?

[Kraskovskiy] In performing the task of detecting ballistic missiles, the systems for warning against a missile attack simultaneously track objects in space and transmit information on them to the command post of the system for the monitoring of space, which issues its information for the general needs of the forces. A high degree of reliability of data on air and space targets is achieved.

Thus, the forces that have the indicated systems are definitely defensive in nature. They are in a state of continuous combat readiness and here they have organized duty around the clock. The combat crews are well trained and are capable of performing their combat tasks independently and without reinforcements.

[Babakin] Are there similar forces in the United States and other countries? How are they similar to ours and how do they differ?

[Kraskovskiy] The United States, for example, possesses developed elements of such forces, above all systems to warn of a nuclear missile strike and to monitor space. The tasks to be resolved by these systems are identical here and there and the principles of their formation are also almost the same. In addition, the Americans, having deployed a number of information systems beyond the borders of their national territory (in England, Greenland, etc.), have the possibility of achieving better performance with respect to warning time and the completeness of the monitoring of missiles in space. The Pentagon links the prospects for the further development of these systems with the realization of the well-known SDI program. The USSR is elaborating an alternative version of the development of forces, the basis of which is the concept of counteracting the multilevel air defense of the United States.

At the present time, the United States has the most advanced resources of the system for defense against missiles in space. For the next 10 to 15 years, nonetheless, there are plans for an extensive program to modernize all components of this system aimed at improving their efficiency and the establishment of a unified system of defense on the basis of the latest achievements of science, engineering, and promising technologies.

[Babakin] But why was the construction of the radar station in the region of the city of Mukachevo frozen? What happened there?

[Kraskovskiy] Indeed, the construction of the radar station in the region of Mukachevo was stopped by order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 2 August 1990. Work is now under way to mothball the buildings and facilities.

Construction questions and site of the direct placement of radar elements were coordinated in advance with agencies at the union, republic, and local levels. The facility began to be built after the conclusion of a state study. All indications are that the station would be completely harmless to health. The question of water use was studied separately.

But various informal organizations of Zakarpatskaya Oblast with the support of local party and soviet agencies began active propaganda about the supposed negative impact of the radar station under construction on people's health and on the environment. Unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations were held and there were strikes at enterprises. The basic demand was for the closing of the radar station under construction and of another one already operating. So it is.

The fight against these radars is actually just a screen under the cover of which the leaders of a number of informal organizations are producing speculation and attracting to their side the population of the oblast for the accomplishment of narrow nationalistic goals, the blowing up of anti-army and antisocialist attitudes, and the gaining of political power.

[Babakin] But for some reason people developed fears. So probably by no means everything has been done to prevent the developing campaign against the radar station under construction?

[Kraskovskiy] In July 1989, by order of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, an extradepartmental commission was appointed under the chairmanship of corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences V. Shestopalov to assess the supposed harmful influence of the facility. The commission included prominent scientists and specialists, including from Zakarpatskaya Oblast. They were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the construction and the technical documentation. The result was the conclusion that the basic parameters of the radiation that may affect the health of people and the environment do not exceed the allowed limits. In addition, they rejected the idea of the existence of a nuclear reactor at the facility. This year, by a decision of the State Commission on Military-Industrial Questions of the USSR Council of Ministers, a commission chaired by academician Ye. Velikhov worked at the facility. The results of its work also confirmed that the strength of the electromagnetic flow does not exceed the established standards and will not represent a danger to the health of people and that the water supply will not harm the sources of mineral and ground waters.

[Babakin] Thus, Volter Makarovich, the government and the Defense Ministry took the necessary steps to calm the public and to prevent the spread of false rumors?

[Kraskovskiy] But these measures were clearly inadequate, especially at the time when events were just developing. I think that if the state and national security

require such systems, then their operation must be ensured through the appropriate legislation. Then it will not be necessary to make concessions to localistic attitudes.

[Babakin] Accordingly, it is necessary to understand that as a result of the closing of this facility a certain amount of harm has been done to our national security?

[Kraskovskiy] The radar station in the region of Mukachevo is one of nine analogous facilities of the ballistic missile early warning system allowed by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty and deployed in sectors in danger of missiles. In the case at hand, the stopping of the construction of the radar station will lead to the loss of control of the southwest sector in danger of missiles, because the radar station now operating in this region will soon have exhausted its service life.

I am convinced that the cessation of the work on the radar station in the region of Mukachevo has done substantial harm to our security and increased our lag in the development of national warning and monitoring systems in comparison with analogous systems of the United States.

As for economic losses, 109 million rubles of 158.6 million rubles for capital construction has already been spent. Significant sums have also been spent on the manufacture of technological equipment.

[Babakin] Are the forces satisfied with the level of armament? How is its improvement seen in the course of the military reform?

[Kraskovskiy] Monopolism in some areas of production and the lack of healthy competition among enterprises and of competitive developments is in some cases holding back the creation of systems with the necessary combat specifications. We have to be satisfied with what industry offers. But even so, the tactical and technical performance of our systems is not inferior to that of the Americans but even exceeds them in some indicators. The production equipment is most advanced in our country.

At the same time, there are also problems here. And quite a few. Thus, deadlines for the building of facilities are often exceeded because of the poor project planning of engineering complexes, the slow pace of construction work, the irregularity of deliveries, and the assembly and adjustment of gear and equipment. By the time they are put into operation, a significant part of the resource is expended and the equipment itself becomes obsolete to some extent. And troop specialists are also employed irrationally. Moreover the imperfection of the basic elements of some of the systems and gear and the inadequate reliability of mechanical equipment require a redundancy of individual elements, which leads to a complication of equipment as a whole and to the maintenance of a large number of officers and junior specialists for the performance of the tasks of alert duty and the servicing of equipment. Unfortunately, this is not always

considered by individual officials who in the course of the military reform resolve questions in the manning of our forces.

[Babakin] What measures, in your view, are necessary to raise the dependability of these forces?

[Kraskovskiy] To do this under current conditions, it seems to me that the main efforts should concentrate on the improvement of the ballistic missile early warning system with the objective of raising its viability and increasing the warning time and on the creation of new systems to monitor the work performed by the United States in the SDI program.

It is also extremely important to develop a system of combat control of forces and systems in such a way that it can guarantee the comprehensive combat employment of all forces and systems of the USSR Armed Forces capable of combating the ballistic missiles and space systems of the probable adversary.

[Babakin] But are these measures sufficient? Is it possible that substantial guarantees from the state are still required?

[Kraskovsky] Considering the importance and strategic significance of the missions being performed by these forces, it appears expedient to define the special status of their installations in the Law on Defense. Under the conditions of the transition of the national economy to cost accounting and a regulated market, it is necessary to provide for the centralized supply under a priority state order of large special facilities of the forces in funded as well as unfunded production. It is desirable to entrust the establishment of new facilities to a single contract organization capable of developing a technological unit and an engineering complex on a competitive basis and of building the facility under a unified project to the point where it is turned over for operation. It is probable that such an approach would generally correspond to the spirit of the military reform being carried out.

[Babakin] Is it your personal opinion that the billions spent on SDI are paying off?

[Kraskovskiy] It is the general opinion of Western analysts that the SDI program will be unprecedented in its total cost and that its expenditures will exceed the largest military and civilian programs of the United States. Thus, the landing of a man on the moon cost \$120 billion (in the prices of fiscal year 1987) and the war of the United States in Indochina in 1965-1972 cost \$300 billion. According to the estimates of the "Union of Concerned Scientists," SDI will cost more than \$1 trillion. The technical idea behind SDI in the form in which it is advertised (the establishment of an invulnerable shield) is dubious, to put it mildly. There are many ways to overcome this system. But individual elements of it such as the space information system, for example, could make a substantial contribution to raising the combat capabilities of national systems for warning and monitoring. Many directions of work on this program

such as the development of anti-missile missiles in the interests of SDI are dead ends.

[Babakin] How many reconnaissance installations of the adversary are aimed at the USSR every year? Are they becoming more or less numerous? It is obvious that it is now extremely important for the Soviet people to talk about this so that they could have an idea of the disposition of forces in the world and could decide whether or not it is necessary to increase national security.

[Kraskovskiy] Surveillance of the territory of the USSR through the reconnaissance systems of the United States of America is accomplished with the help of different kinds of artificial satellites and radar stations.

The reconnaissance satellites of the United States are placed in orbits from 200 to 4,000 km high and equipped with photographic and movie cameras, with infrared and multispectral sensors, and with equipment for radio interception. They perform continuous day and night reconnaissance over the territory of the USSR. With their help, objects are photographed, information in radio networks is monitored, and missile launches and nuclear blasts are detected.

The network of radar stations monitoring the territory of the USSR for the purpose of the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles includes the systems for warning of nuclear missile strikes BMEWS (three radar posts—in Greenland, Alaska, and Great Britain) and Pave Paws (four posts in the territory of the United States, two of which are aimed at the territory of the USSR), the radar station PAR [phased-array radar] of the former Safeguard air defense complex (in North Dakota), and the radar facility Cobra Dane (on the island of Shemya in the Pacific Ocean). Aircraft moving in the direction of the United States are detected through a system of 14 radars above the horizon and four radars beyond the horizon.

At the present time, 36 U.S. reconnaissance satellites with operational on-board equipment are aimed at the USSR. Low-orbit satellites are carrying out radar, optical-electronic, and radio and radio-engineering reconnaissance of the country's territory as well as radio-engineering reconnaissance of the likely sea and oceanic theaters of naval operations.

Low-orbit reconnaissance satellites make 42 passes over the territory of the USSR every day.

[Babakin] We are now hearing frequent critical comments in the press, radio, and television about the army, including the forces that you named, devouring the people's money "uselessly." What is your opinion in this regard?

[Kraskovskiy] I have already had the occasion to speak on this subject when I met with labor collectives in the Transcarpathian and Baltic districts. Some people are frankly in error when they think that in relations

between states the efforts of our diplomacy have put an end to wars once and for all. Apparently the successes of diplomacy are not always illuminated objectively here. Everything is done to extol their own assessments and adequate consideration is not given to the assessments of the other side. Many people get the erroneous idea of the achievement of absolute security for our country and of the lack of need for powerful armed forces and expensive weapon systems. If I may put it this way, we are seeing a kind of self-disarmament syndrome. Hence the protests against military facilities.

And what is the result? The U.S. administration does not completely rule out the possibility under certain circumstances, of course, of a return to confrontation. It is strengthening its own armed forces and protecting all national defense systems. There they do not by any means have a situation in which they have ceased construction of facilities like our radar stations or in which harm has been done to some component of strategic offensive arms.

Here even the conclusions of the State Commission on the harmlessness of the radar station in the region of Mukachevo were not taken into account. This creates the false impression that the armed forces and the troops under consideration are "devouring" the people's money.

I assume that the reader will judge for himself who is right.

[Babakin] Today many criticize our armed forces for the low level of military discipline. Frequently this criticism is justified. But what is the state of discipline among those who serve in the forces that we are talking about here? For as we understand you, they have a particular degree of responsibility there.

[Kraskovskiy] I will say frankly that this question is quite acute. The unconstitutional decisions of the supreme soviets of several republics on military questions are pushing young people into crime. We have cases of the unauthorized abandonment of units by service personnel called up from Georgia, Armenia, and the Baltic republics. As a rule, parents take the Georgians and Armenians away from the units in private cars. Those from the Baltic republics have a different method. They send telegrams attested by physicians with the request that the soldier be dismissed to visit gravely ill relatives. We let them go and they do not return to the unit. A follow-up reveals that the requests are false.

And sometimes they resort to open slander. Thus, on 30 June of this year, a certain S. Chaykovskiy who was called up by the Babushkin Rayon Military Commissariat of the city of Dnepropetrovsk came to the troop receiver to perform his military service. By 5 July he came to the medical unit complaining of stomach pains. As it turned out later, this was gastritis. That same day the soldier calls his parents to the unit. After talking with her son, the mother informs her fellow-workers at her enterprise about unstatutory relations in the unit and

asks for help. And there, without giving it a lot of thought, they take action. They send a telegram that says the following: "To delegate of 28th CPSU Congress from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Comrade G.G. Lobode and USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov. The collective of motor vehicle enterprise 0461 of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Gosstroy demands an immediate investigation in the current wildly criminal situation in the military unit. The debauchery of the 'old ways' has attained an incredible scope leading to two deaths. On 4 July, the son of our worker Chaykovsky was beaten and intimated to the point that if measures are not taken he will also kill himself. Immediately [give an] answer to the enterprise and by television to all mothers. Secretary of the party organization Tsalko."

[Babakin] What a slashing telegram!

[Kraskovskiy] Yes, you read these lines and it is bitter and insulting to you. How far they can go in their striving to defile the army! In July, a commission of representatives of the General Staff, main commissariat of the Air Defense Forces, and medical institutions worked in the units. No signs of a beating were found in medical examinations. And S. Chaykovskiy did not complain to anyone about this. All of the soldiers in the unit declared that Chaykovskiy was being deceitful and they talked about his unwillingness to serve and his striving to avoid performing his service duties. Well, the result was the defiling of a good military collective, the collective of a motor vehicle enterprise was deceived, and officers, sergeants, and soldiers were offended.

It appears that this example can give food for thought. Is it not time to call to administrative and, in some cases, to criminal account for slandering the army? World practice shows that in many states they are very strict about attempts to defile service personnel. Substantial money fines have been introduced. It is probably time to resort to these measures here in our country as well.

Under the conditions at hand, it is necessary to seek new forms of explanatory and educational work with personnel. For help we bring in the people's deputies of the soviets and representatives of judicial bodies. But here it is necessary to do a great deal of work with people.

* * *

Let us be frank. Our armed forces are now living through a difficult time. Mass meetings are being held at the Defense Ministry building, the military commissariats are being blocked, and anti-army demonstrations are being organized in different military units. All of this is causing concern about the fate of the armed forces and our defense capability. And now it is still too early to say that the superradars can be retired. They will perform their difficult duty for many years to come. But now, under the conditions of military reform and the reduction of the armed forces, it has become necessary for interested persons and our government to maintain a very prudent attitude toward systems for ballistic missile early warning, the monitoring of space, and antiballistic-missile defense.

For they were built at the price of the incredible efforts of the entire nation. Localistic egoism, manifestations of nationalism, and anti-army attitudes must not hinder the actions of our forces.

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ABM Systems, Cooperation Against Third Country Threat Urged

*91WC0060A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 6, 1-7 Feb 91 p 1*

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences Sergey Blagovolin, head of the department of military-economic and military-political research of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Disarmament; What Next?"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf has raised many critical issues. And one of the main ones is how this war will affect the prospects for arms control and disarmament. One cannot but see that we are speaking about a serious new factor which affects the entire world situation—the formation of new regional centers of military power capable of causing a threatening aggravation of the international situation (such as Iraq has demonstrated).

Past years have been marked by a number of significant successes in the area of disarmament: We have managed to agree on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles and to advance significantly along the path of preparation of an agreement on an important reduction of strategic weapons. On the agenda is a complete ban on testing of nuclear weapons.

But something else has also become apparent: It has become clear that we are still a long way from the elimination of nuclear weapons and, of course, the year 2000 will not be the point at which the non-nuclear "golden age" begins for humankind. Moreover, the development of events in the world and the real threat of the spread of nuclear missile weapons lead to the conclusion that the prospects for nuclear disarmament are by no means contained within the framework of Soviet-U.S. relations, and even enlisting other "official" nuclear powers in the negotiations will not solve the problem. The situation has turned out to be considerably more complicated and contradictory than it seemed even a couple of years ago. But the obvious need for the "five" to retain nuclear arsenals does not mean that we should not strive to reduce them to a minimum. At the same time we must begin right now to think about a system of effective measures that is capable, if not of preventing the expansion of the nuclear club, at least of limiting the negative consequences of it. One of the possible steps in this direction could be the development of an ABM system which is designed for protection from missiles of the types that "third" countries might have in the foreseeable future but does not affect our strategic stability.

A decisive breakthrough (with the signing of the treaty in Paris) has occurred in the sphere of conventional arms limitation. But the crisis in the Persian Gulf gives plenty of food for thought about the path that should be taken after the implementation of the Paris agreements.

I think that both the USSR and the Western countries are on the threshold of a radical revision of the principles of arms control. The existing ones are rapidly becoming outdated. Regional conflicts and the appearance of new centers of military power will exert a growing influence on the entire process of arms control. Consequently, we must have not only nuclear but also conventional forces that are extremely effective and capable of reacting quickly to the appearance of possible threats for which, I fear, we will not have to wait long. Therefore, instead of striving for maximum disarmament of one another (although there probably still are certain possibilities for further reduction), we should switch to searching for ways to optimize our joint efforts, cooperate, and restructure our forces, taking the new situation into account. We will still have a need for an effective military force for a long time to come—not like what we have now, but one that is smaller in terms of quantitative parameters but much better from a qualitative standpoint. Only then will we be able really to speak about military cooperation with the developed countries and necessary guarantees of our country's security.

Finally, another circumstance which is directly related to the future of arms control. We should not assume that we will be able to "separate" our foreign and domestic policies. The tragic events in the Baltic region should finally become a lesson in this respect. Either we decide to be a part of the civilized world or we continue to gallop completely alone "on a spirited steed," brandishing our sword and steadily approaching an inevitable catastrophe.

Space Expert Interviewed on ERIS Antimissile Test

PM1102153191 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
11 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Radionov, leading specialist with the USSR Defense Ministry's Space Units, by correspondent V. Litovkin, under the "Details for *IZVESTIYA*" rubric; place and date not given: "Patriot for Space; United States Tests New Antimissile Unit"]

[Text] In late January the U.S. Army's Strategic Defense Command staged an experiment during which the ground-based ERIS [Exo-atmospheric Reentry Interceptor System] unit intercepted and destroyed over the Pacific a ballistic missile launched from Vandenberg AFB, California.

Our correspondent asked Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Radionov, a leading specialist with the USSR Defense

Ministry's Space Units, to discuss the background to the experiment and just what the ERIS antimissile complex is.

[Radionov] The ERIS combat complex is a land-based nonnuclear antimissile interceptor designed to destroy strategic missile warheads at altitudes of between 800 km and 100 km and at a range of up to 4,500 km. It can also be used as an antisatellite system to hit spacecraft in low orbits. It comprises a two-stage solid-fuel rocket based on the Minuteman I ICBM and a deployable nose section equipped with a multispectral homing warhead. Work is also under way to develop [sozdaniye] a cluster warhead. Missiles are downed by a direct hit.

[Litovkin] Does this mean that a kind of Patriot has been developed for space?

[Radionov] Undoubtedly. It is expected that the ERIS complex could enter service with the U.S. Army in 1994-1996. It is planned to have up to 100 missiles on combat standby. Although U.S. specialists believe that such a quantity is hardly enough to intercept a massive nuclear missile strike, it is very effective as an antisatellite weapon: It could hit 60-85 percent of spacecraft in low orbits.

[Litovkin] Can we consider that the first step has been taken toward the development of SDI? If so, how will ICBM's be intercepted and destroyed? How will the precise warhead that poses a real threat be "chosen"? After all, the rest could be dummies.

[Radionov] Yes, we consider the development of this complex to be a real contribution to the SDI system. This, incidentally, was directly stated by the country's President, G. Bush, in his 29 January address to Congress. In his opinion, a strategic defense system should include space-based components to defend against unsanctioned ICBM launches, and land-based complexes to defend specific ground targets. ERIS is an indispensable part of this complex.

The U.S. military department has asked Congress for \$4.5 billion for the SDI program in 1992, and I think that, following the successful interception of the ICBM warhead, it will get the money.

The interception took place at an altitude of 160 km in the region of Kwajalein atoll. The interceptor warhead was not equipped with explosives. It was fitted with a special umbrella-like device 4.6 meters in diameter, which unfurled a few seconds before impact, ensnared the target like a net, and destroyed it. Another curious point is that the closing speed of target and interceptor at impact was six km a second! The process was monitored [kontrolirovalsya] from on board a specially equipped aircraft. Another aircraft was used to determine the meteorological situation in the test area.

During the 30 minutes between the missile's launch from Vandenberg air base and its landing in the region of Kwajalein Atoll, space-, air-, and land-based systems

tracked the ICBM and established its trajectory parameters. Incidentally, you can follow this process on the [accompanying] diagram. Real-time (that is, second by second) information on this was received by the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs, California [as published] to work out target designation as the missile was tracked.

The "choice" of the right warhead was made by multi-spectral sensors in the homing warhead. In short, the highest standard of technical problem-solving was demonstrated at all levels.

[Litovkin] Is our country capable of carrying out similar missions?

[Radionov] I do not think so....

Success of Patriots Linked to Renewal of SDI

*PM1002190991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Feb 91 First Edition p 6*

[Report by correspondent V. Gan: "United States: Boost for 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Washington—Technophobia is a new term in Washington's political lexicon, evidently by analogy with euphoria. It is used to describe the enthusiastic sentiments reigning here in connection with the quite impressive successes of the advanced technology used in U.S. weapons systems.

In general, there is nothing unnatural about enthusiasm for superprecise bombs, lasers, computers, etc. Now, however, on the eve of the Pentagon's submitting its new budget to Congress, it certainly does not seem so harmless.

Take, for example, the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], nicknamed the "Star Wars" program. Aimed at militarizing space, under pressure from criticism and doubts as to its feasibility, it began to go into a decline, as it were, losing funds every year. But the program recently received a very strong and unexpected boost. Seizing on the relative effectiveness of the Patriot anti-missile launcher in intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles, the administration began lobbying in every possible way in favor of its activation. In their public statements, President Bush and then Vice President Quayle and some members of Congress insistently tried to prove the reality and the necessity of having SDI systems in space. According to Quayle in particular, "the Patriot missiles have shot down the arguments against the program, and we must rethink our position."

Encouraged by the highest support, the Pentagon disseminated, as though "by chance," photographs and a short animated film recording the successful interception of ballistic missiles by "Star Wars" weapons. At the same time it was learned that approximately \$4.6 billion

will be requested for the needs of this program in the new military budget, or \$1.7 billion more than in the current year.

For serious scientists, however, the comparisons drawn by the administration between the Patriot and SDI systems do not stand up to any criticism if only because their concepts are totally different in character. As P. Klouzen [name as transliterated], research director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, says, "the SDI program provides for the siting of weapons in space and so will be unsuitable for combatting such short-range missiles such as Scuds." Moreover, in a number of instances even the Patriot has proved powerless to intercept a Scud. There is another factor—the nuclear factor. In order to be effective in intercepting nuclear missiles, SDI must be absolutely perfect. According to J. Pike, spokesman for the Federation of American Scientists, "when a Scud missile gets through, the damage might be limited to the destruction of a store. But if SDI lets a nuclear ballistic missile through, an entire city, at least, will be lost." In other words, there is not a single system that would fully guarantee people's safety.

I can hardly assume that Pentagon officials themselves do not agree with this in secret as well. In my view, it is a question of a desire to rehabilitate Washington's policy of the previous decade or, as it was called at the time, the "Pentagonization" of the U.S. economy—a policy of increasing military expenditure in every possible way, of unbridled militarism. The Pentagon would clearly like once again to be given "carte blanche" even in these changed times.

Commentary Links Gulf War, Reorienting of SDI

*LD1502085391 Moscow World Service in English
2300 GMT 14 Feb 91*

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Henry Cooper, director of the SDI or Star Wars project, in Washington, has announced the details of reorienting the program and said \$41 billion will be spent on it during the nineties.

Here is a commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov:

Paradoxical as it is, the Pentagon intends to use the Gulf war to save a project born by the Cold War. The idea of SDI, or Star Wars, is fading away for many reasons because Americans no longer have the fear of Soviet missile attacks, because according to many experts it's impossible to build an impenetrable shield over the United States to protect from a nuclear attack. Naturally, the Congress has been much less willing to inject all the money requested by the administration in the project. Now, the advocates of Star Wars have a new argument related to the Gulf war: If Patriot missiles are capable of destroying Scud missiles, not everything has been lost for the SDI program.

Following this logic, new proposals were worked out. What do they amount to? According to Henry Cooper, the new approach is called GPALS, or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. It's not meant to protect America from a large-scale nuclear attack for the simple reason that this is impossible, but this forced restriction is probably the only one. In many other respects, the SDI program will virtually expand. To begin with, the spending on the program is to grow from \$2.9 billion this year to \$4.6 billion in the next fiscal year, beginning on 1 October. While in the past the new armaments were supposed to be stationed only in U.S. territory, now they should be taken to all the places where the troops of America and its allies are stationed. According to the old plan, the antimissile missiles were supposed to be stationed on land; under the new plan, they will also be carried by ships and planes.

It must also be stressed that the development of space weapons is also expanding; the details have been reported by THE WASHINGTON POST. A big share of the 4.6 billion asked for the new version of the SDI is expected to be spent on space-based weapon systems, weapons that cannot be stationed without violating the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on antiballistic missile defense. And what of the claims about the advocates of (?reorienting the) SDI that the new approach reflects the concern about the threats coming from the Third World and not the Soviet Union? The development and stationing of thousands of units of American weapons on land, sea and planes around the world and in outer space affect international security and Soviet-American relations are part of international relations.

Put forward at the height of the Cold War, the SDI program contradicted agreement on the limitation of nuclear and conventional armaments, and the new version of the SDI can only serve as a catalyst for the arms race, because the other countries will not sit back while America develops new types of weapons.

Baranovichi Holds Pro-Army Meeting

PM1502142591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by TASS correspondent L. Tratsevskiy: "For Unity With Army"]

[Text] Baranovichi—A large meeting of unity with the Soviet Army was held by working people of the Belorussian city of Baranovichi. They gathered with the soldiers and officers who had come there at the monument to the servicemen and partisans of the Great Patriotic War.

"I feel grief and anger whenever I hear blasphemous accusations against our army," said N. Kostina, a worker at the local cotton knitted goods association. "We will remember forever the heroes who liberated our city from fascist slavery. We shall pass on that feeling of gratitude to our children."

The speeches voiced the common opinion of the meeting's participants: The army is the child of the people and concern for it is a nationwide responsibility. Posters and placards with inscriptions reading "You are our hope, you are our bulwark," "We are with you, sons!" and "No to anti-army provocations" were raised over the square.

The servicemen were presented with flowers and souvenirs. Women offered the soldiers and officers homemade pies.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Military Rejects Reports on SS-12's, CFE Status

PM1002164791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by V. Litovkin: "U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock to Chief of General Staff Army General M. Moiseyev: I Am Staggered at the False Report"]

[Text] THE [London] TIMES has published an article reporting that Iraq possibly possesses highly accurate Soviet-made SS-12 missiles.

Major General G. Kashuba, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center, comments on this report:

The SS-12 missile system (the treaty designates it as the OTR-22) was capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 900 km. It was subject to reduction and, in accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, was totally destroyed—I wish to emphasize—in the presence of representatives of the U.S. Army.

This system was not delivered anywhere abroad and, naturally, cannot be in Iraq. The report of the presence of such missiles in the Persian Gulf region is an invention.

Incidentally, certain Western mass media have repeatedly resorted to such fantasies in recent days. Thus, THE WASHINGTON POST writes in the article "Red Army Show of Force" that the USSR Armed Forces General Staff reported to J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, in December 1990 that "the military does not recognize the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe because it was concluded by the Foreign Ministry, which was headed at that time by E. Shevardnadze." The article also maintains that the General Staff "entrusted its representatives at the strategic arms talks with rejecting a quite important part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, which had almost been agreed by E. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State J. Baker in Houston." All these were supposedly "the chief factors in E. Shevardnadze's dramatic resignation and President G. Bush's decision to 'postpone' the summit meeting."

In this connection J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, sent Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, an official letter.

"I was staggered at the false report in the U.S. press that you supposedly told me in December that the USSR Armed Forces General Staff would not fulfill the terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," he writes. "You and I know that no such conversation took place.... I believe that the importance of this agreement and of U.S.-Soviet relations in general demands both an urgent public response and an assurance that that erroneous article is not our understanding of your position with regard to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces."

There would appear to be nothing to add to what has been said, but for one detail. Such articles attest that some people are not averse to casting doubt on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and between Presidents M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush and trying, with the help of disinformation, to wreck the ratification of treaties concluded between our countries.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Foreign Ministry Official Criticizes CFE Implementation

*PM0502172491 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS
in English No 3, 20-27 Jan 91 p 13*

[Interview with unidentified "senior official of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs" by Dmitriy Yakushkin; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are introduction: "The End of the Vienna Agreements?"]

[Text] Will the Paris Treaty—the first agreement on the realistic reduction of conventional armaments in Europe [CFE], signed in 1990—prove trouble-free? As it now appears, the transfer of a few thousand tanks, armoured carriers and guns from Europe beyond the Urals, undertaken in the summer of 1990, as well as of three Soviet land divisions (out of the same forces) under the control of the Navy and, finally, the confusion about the figures presented by the USSR endanger its ratification in Western parliaments.

To clarify the details MN [MOSCOW NEWS] analyst Dmitriy Yakushkin met a senior official of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs who participated in the Vienna talks.

[Yakushkin] Is there really any reason for anxiety?

[Official] At any rate our partners in negotiations believe there is sufficient reason for anxiety. Let's say the transfer of divisions and armaments to the Navy is assessed in the West as a way to circumvent the Paris Treaty, which allegedly shows its ineffectiveness. The stationing of armaments beyond the Urals is regarded in

the West as a desire to create a major strategic reserve in Asia which, as has been proved, may be quickly redeployed.

[Yakushkin] When and in what way did these facts become known?

[Official] The Americans stated this at the negotiations in September. It came as a surprise for us diplomats. The first leak of information into the Western press took place after the Paris meeting.

[Yakushkin] How do you explain the operations which were carried out?

[Official] The motives of the military are clear: to preserve as much hardware as possible. This is a natural desire. Moreover, in case of a redeployment the treaty is not formally violated. But we must realize that it is our duty to think of the consequences of any such step and to give prompt and proper explanations of any decisions taken.

Unfortunately, it did not happen in this case. First, everything was done too late (almost after the Paris meeting), second, our arguments that the redeployment corresponded to unilateral reductions, that the outdated material in Asia, after being replaced by newly arrived equipment, is being eliminated and that our military potential in Asia has not escalated, have not yet satisfied our partners.

If the Treaty is not ratified, it will endanger the European process and bring to nought all our efforts to integrate the USSR in the European community. What's more, this will naturally affect other negotiations on tactical weapons due to start immediately after the Paris meeting, and on strategic offensive weapons, which are in the final stage. Given the situation, reasonable apprehensions arise in the West: who is taking decisions in this country-political leaders or uncontrolled military bodies.

[Yakushkin] But the Americans too withdrew their forces in the course of negotiations...

[Official] Yes, but on a considerably smaller scale, particularly in connection with the Persian Gulf crisis. Besides, during the talks they submitted exhaustive information on that score.

[Yakushkin] What can be done now?

[Official] Till the middle of February we have the opportunity to remove all alternative figures, specifying or correcting our own. As for the armaments transferred beyond the Urals, Western concern may be lessened if firm guarantees are given that the transferred equipment will replace outdated and destroyed hardware. Western observers must be convinced of this. Regarding the navy. A political statement can be made on freezing the number of naval forces and the land-based heavy armaments attached to them. The other, more consistent, version is that if this happened we

should agree to include the hardware transferred there in the levels established by the Paris Treaty.

[Yakushkin] Despite the leak of information you spoke about, the Western side does not seem overconcerned by all this...

[Official] Perhaps you're right... First, the character of relations has changed. Formerly the Americans wouldn't fail to make use of it. Second, at the given moment all their attention is concentrated on the Gulf. Finally, I think there is a desire on the part of legislators who keep a sharp eye on the disarmament process not to endanger those who worked on the treaty.

Sea Travel Slows Troop Withdrawal From Germany

PM0402194691 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by Major S. Popov and Lieutenant Colonel V. Khabarov: "Troop Withdrawal... With Hindrances"]

[Text] Now that Poland has stopped transit across its territory by units and formations of the Western Group of Forces, they are forced to return home via the Baltic Sea. By ship from the Rostock sea port and by ferry from Mukran.

Operations are under way virtually around the clock at Rostock and Mukran. Major forces and experienced leaders have been sent in. The other day the ship Inzhener Machulskiy brought 92 tanks out of Rostock—the biggest consignment of heavy equipment dispatched from Germany this year. The first battalions and hundreds of combat vehicles have already left Mukran. The pace of the troop withdrawal is extremely fast. As Colonel B. Kosov, chief of the operations group in Mukran, thinks, for instance, it is unrealistic to bring out the entire Western Group of Forces by sea. This opinion is shared by specialists from the group of forces' military transport communications service. As Col. V. Plyuta, its chief, explained, despite all the efforts, the plan for operational shipments in January was only 50 percent fulfilled.

Moving the troops by sea creates a whole series of problems. First, financial. If every departing Soviet division is sent on a "cruise," first going to northern Germany by train (and here the use of one freightcar axle costs 360 marks) and from there by sea to Klaipeda, and then direct to its new station, the sum of 1 billion marks allocated by the German side for our transport expenses will not be enough. Second, troops traveling by sea necessarily have to be "fragmented": There is not room for the people and equipment in a single hold.

In short, if you face up to the truth, it is obvious that no heroic superefforts by the military from the Western Group of Forces can resolve the problems of the withdrawal (within the established time frame, that is). What is needed first and foremost is a political decision to

conclude the appropriate accords with Poland. But for now... For now, thousands of soldiers and officers are working without rest, and tanks "accustomed" to land routes are going by sea.

Grinevskiy Comments on CSBM Talks

LD0602132591 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 6 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, February 6 (TASS)—A regular plenary meeting of parties to the Vienna talks on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM] in Europe was held here today. The purpose of the talks is to promote the CSCE process in the military-political sphere and strengthen security and cooperation on the European continent and in the world as a whole.

It was stressed at the meeting that in light of the tasks now facing them, the 34 nations involved have to exert constructive efforts and find ways to elaborate the said measures and make them efficient and forestalling.

Much has to be done. For instance, it is necessary to add concrete substance to seminars on military doctrines in 1991. The view was expressed at the current meeting that its agenda should include problems related not only to conventional armed forces, but also nuclear and naval armaments and principles for their utilisation.

The meeting will have to settle several technical problems related to the CSCE communication system, reach agreement on the methods for exchanging data on military forces, etc. No agreement has still been reached on confidence-building measures and security in the sphere of naval and air forces. As to naval forces, experts believe steps could already be taken to elaborate such simple confidence-building measures as the monitoring of their activities and advanced warning about them.

The view is being expressed by participants of the negotiations that measures should be elaborated to establish the qualitative parameters of armaments, since corresponding measures have already been drawn up for many key military spheres. This is a rather difficult task, because it affects the security of all states involved. However, it must be considered already now.

"The Soviet delegation is prepared to get down to a joint purposeful discussion of the problem," head of the Soviet delegation roving ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy told TASS. He believes there is practically no obstacle to the elaboration of new measures, restricting military activities on the ground, on the sea and in the air. "This would be an effective step to further strengthen European security and advance towards European unity," Grinevskiy noted.

WGF Commander Visits Bonn To Discuss Withdrawal

LD0602212391 Moscow TASS in English 2105 GMT 6 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Sosnovskiy and Lev Volnukhin]

[Text] Bonn, February 6 (TASS)—Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Troops [WGF] Colonel General Matvey Burlakov today visited Bonn where he met FRG Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, German Army General Inspector Dieter Wellershoff and had talks at the FRG Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Finance. Burlakov also had talks with Chairman of the Social Democratic Party Hans-Jochen Vogel.

The talks focused on ways to implement the treaty between the USSR and the FRG laying down the terms for the temporary stay and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. Burlakov called attention to problems which hamper the withdrawal of troops and need joint efforts of German and Soviet sides.

Burlakov told TASS that the pull-out involves a great amount of people, equipment, resources, their subsequent deployment on Soviet territory and housing construction. "Having started the realisation of the treaty, we have encountered technical, financial, property and other problems which, naturally, should be solved with an eye to the legitimate interests of the FRG and the USSR," he said.

Burlakov stressed that the Bonn talks showed that the two sides understood existing problems and were ready to pool their efforts to tackle them.

Obsolete Tanks Scrapped in Novosibirsk

PM0702140391 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 6 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent V. Yelmakov report: "That's How Weapons Die"]

[Text] Novosibirsk was the destination for dozens of railroad flatcars and trailers laden with tanks. Combat hardware was not being redeployed: The "dismantling" of the previously formidable weapons has been organized here at the local "Vtorchermet" Association so they can then be smelted down.

"More than 100 tanks of obsolete models—half of which have already been turned into scrap metal—have arrived in a short time," your TASS correspondent was told by Yu. Zuyev, the association's deputy director. "We did not previously deal with tanks. We had to work out techniques for dismantling them. Provision is made for safety measures: The bodies arrive separately from the turrets, guns, and fuel tanks."

The scrapping of tanks has also been organized in a number of other cities in the Siberian Military District.

Delay in Ratifying CFE Treaty Viewed

LD0702150391 Moscow World Service in Russian 1210 GMT 7 Feb 91

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Excerpts] The American Secretary of State James Baker has recommended that President Bush delay the ratification of the agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] signed by the heads of 22 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries in Paris last November. James Baker informed the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 6 February about this subject.

Yuriy Solton has this comment:

The secretary of state gave a dramatic form to his statement. Having the Soviet Union in mind, he said the matter goes to the heart of credibility and trust. What has made James Baker cast a shadow on the policy of the country, the importance of which as a partner he stressed on so many occasions before?

As it turns out, Washington officials question the authenticity of the data about the Soviet weapons subject to cut. [passage omitted]

After the signing of the agreement, the Soviet Union gave additional explanations on Washington's request about the quantity of its military equipment covered by the agreement. The explanations were very convincing to my mind, but it is the business of experts to check and re-check. I see nothing wrong in this. What actually arouses concern is the rashness of the conclusions drawn at the top political level.

The American secretary of state questions Moscow's credibility. But it may also be the case that the other side is simply not inclined to go rapidly down the road of disarmament. There's food for thought there, I think.

The preparation of the START agreement has been delayed, though Soviet experts believe that it could be completed already now. Not all things are clear in the approaches of Washington to talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Now it has been recommended that the process of ratification of the agreement on conventional weapons in Europe be delayed.

The coincidences of this play into the hands of the conservative-minded politicians and military in the Soviet Union. They are already criticizing the Soviet leadership for concessions to the arrangement under which the Soviet Union is to reduce more weapons than NATO and for leaving the question of the naval force in which NATO enjoys supremacy outside the agreement's framework. These groups are critical of the government, because following all the reductions the balance of forces in Europe will be tipped in the favor of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The position that the American state secretary recommends his President to take may also delay the ratification of the agreement of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. As we know, action gives rise to counteraction.

So the agreement in question came into life following difficult discussions. A compromise was eventually achieved that is detrimental to the interests of no one. The verification measures outlined by the agreement allow for such a degree of transparency of the military situation and activities that makes any attempt to bypass the agreement or prepare secretly for an aggression impossible. The agreement lays the foundations for new structures of all European security. It will be regretful if because of some malicious intent or for any other reasons its ratification will be postponed for an indefinite time.

Baker Statement on Treaty Ratification 'Unexpected'

LD0702192291 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT
7 Feb 91

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, February 7 (TASS)—Differences have arisen in the interpretation of the treaty on conventional arms in Europe by its signatories. U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker said in Washington that he would be unable to advise President Bush on sending the treaty to the Congress for ratification unless the disputed points were cleared up.

Baker also said that, although the United States saw no linkage between the conventional arms treaty and the treaty on strategic offensive weapons, new problems might hinder the conclusion of other agreements.

Baker's statement was somewhat unexpected. Until recently, U.S. officials hailed the conventional weapons treaty as their own diplomatic triumph. It was particularly emphasized that the Soviet Union would have to scrap or withdraw from Europe almost 20 times as many weapons as the United States. U.S. diplomats were also proud about leaving the naval forces deployed off European coasts outside the scope of the conventional weapons treaty. U.S. advantages in this field were considerable.

The present dispute centers around three Soviet marine divisions created on the basis of three motorized infantry divisions. It is noteworthy that the question was first raised before the signing of the conventional arms treaty but was left undecided for a number of reasons.

The Soviet side has since proposed a compromise solution. It has expressed readiness to freeze further deployment of both new marine divisions and coast guard arms, although they are not subject to restrictions or cuts under the already signed treaty.

The American side is reluctant to compromise, insisting on its maximum advantages under the treaty. Today's issue of PRAVDA in Moscow says that "certain correctives are needed in the arms control process, proceeding from the Gulf war lessons."

It is hoped in Moscow that Baker's statement does not signal a U.S. departure from the strategy of deciding disarmament and other military-political problems through negotiations and a return to the earlier policy from positions of strength.

Commentators Discuss Status of CSBM Talks, CFE Treaty

LD1002103491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0630 GMT 9 Feb 91

[“Conversation” between commentator Dmitriy Morozov and Aleksandr Zholkver, political observer for the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] This bulletin will be devoted to foreign events. As we have already reported, talks on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe resumed last week in Vienna. The progress of these talks was the subject of a conversation between my colleague, commentator Dmitriy Morozov, and Aleksandr Zholkver, political observer for the new All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.

[Zholkver] I have often visited the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, where talks on most important European problems have been in progress for many years. The Vienna forum has had its ups and downs, its successes and failures during these years. Unquestionably its greatest success was last November's meeting in Paris of the heads of 32 states from Europe, the United States, and Canada, at which many important pan-European documents were signed. Most of these were drafted in Vienna. A kind of lull now seems to have set in at the Vienna talks. It seems that all parties wish to take a fix on the direction of future developments in Europe.

[Morozov] Where do you think they will head now? What are the implications of the direction they take?

[Zholkver] Well, I would say that the foremost subject of discussion at the moment is the future of the treaty on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe [CFE]. You remember how glad we all were when this important document was signed in Paris. But now U.S. Secretary of State Baker has told a congressional hearing that the treaty will not be submitted for ratification by the Senate for the time being.

[Morozov] What is the reason for this, and is this a step backwards by the United States?

[Zholkver] Well, in any case, this is a halt, I would say. Washington says there are differences with the Soviet

Union over the practical implementation of this treaty. In particular, the two sides disagree over ways of counting the number of tanks, including ones used by marines, which are due to be scrapped. Furthermore, the Americans are alleging that we have withdrawn a large number of tanks only as far as the Urals, from where they can be rapidly brought back into Europe.

[Morozov] Well, one naturally hopes this confusion can be cleared up as quickly as possible, to the extent that this is actually possible at the moment.

[Zholkver] Of course, this has to be done. All the confusion must be cleared up. After all, further progress at the Vienna talks depends on this. Steadily increasing attention is being paid there at the moment to the extension of confidence-building measures to naval fleets and aviation. As you know, they are, I would say, a most important component in the armed forces of many states.

[Morozov] Yes, the United States has a substantial advantage over us in this respect. The current hostilities in the Persian Gulf region again demonstrate that they are a very important area of armaments.

[Zholkver] You have aviation and naval forces in mind?

[Morozov] Yes.

[Zholkver] Of course, this is so. But, you know, I would say that the war in the Persian Gulf is forcing people to pay still more attention to the problems of European security, strange as this might seem. It is not merely a question of the close ties between different regions in our so interdependent world. I think more is at stake here. On what principles are contemporary security to be based? On force? As we see, it is not working very well in the Persian Gulf for some reason. On military alliances or coalitions? They have either been hurriedly assembled, in the Persian Gulf region for example, or as in other regions, above all Europe, they have existed for a long time now. But these military alliances are not stable entities. They have been undergoing important changes, especially of late.

[Morozov] Yes, it seems, for example, that the Warsaw Pact is now falling apart completely?

[Zholkver] Well, in any case, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are raising the question of its dissolution with ever increasing insistence. But changes are also taking place within NATO. Its Secretary General Woerner has just disclosed that he has sent all the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance proposals for a substantial revision of its entire strategy.

Let me give you the latest example of this. The large U.S. naval base at the renowned Holy Loch in Britain, which has existed for a long time, is being closed. King, the British defense minister, declared that the base is no longer needed.

[Morozov] In other words, this is an indirect way of saying that they no longer have any potential adversaries in the Baltic or the North Sea.

[Zholkver] Exactly. I have to say that many countries belonging to NATO are now raising the question of creating new, non-bloc structures for European security. An initiative of this kind was put forward at the most recent meeting of the EC Council in Brussels by the foreign ministers of France and Germany. On Malta a group of European experts, who had earlier been working in Vienna, are currently preparing a draft document on the creation of a special mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes in Europe.

[Morozov] Does it mean that Europe will no longer be divided into influence zones and blocs if the first proposal is implemented? How suitable would this mechanism be for settling interethnic problems, in our country for instance?

[Zholkver] Well, as far as the first question is concerned, I would not say—at the moment, unfortunately—that we have already substituted non-bloc thinking for bloc thinking. But, as far as a mechanism for the regulation of interethnic problems is concerned, I would say that any progress in ensuring durable peace and security in Europe depends to a significant, if not decisive, extent on stabilization of the situation in our country.

I would like to conclude our discussion by quoting the words of, I think, one of the most experienced diplomats in contemporary Europe. He is the longest serving foreign minister, the foreign minister of the FRG, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Speaking at the world economic forum in Davos, he said that during crises it is supremely important to keep one's head. None of the current difficulties in the Soviet Union, Genscher declared, can be a reason for calling into question our long-term policy of maintaining security and cooperation in Europe.

Military Observer Views CFE Ratification

*LD1102143891 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 11 Feb 91*

[Text] After the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty member states signed in Paris last November an agreement on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe there are those difficulties with its ratifying. The American side speaks about Soviet insincerity.

Three issues are disputable: whether or not Soviet coastal guard units belong to the ground troops, what the number of facilities subject to control on Soviet territory is and, lastly, the issue of deploying Soviet tanks beyond the Urals. The Radio Moscow military observer, Colonel. Vadim Solovev, with some explanations:

The Soviet coastal guard units are under the operational command of the Navy because they both perform one and the same task—guarding the seacoast. The American side attributes them to the ground troops. To solve this

contradiction, the Soviet side for the umpteenth time suggests spreading the treaty's operation to the Navy as well. The response is a categorical refusal to reduce the Navy.

Another issue is the number of sites and facilities to be subject to control. The Soviet side submitted a list of 900 such sites. The Americans believe that their number should be greater but they don't take into account the fact that over the past two years the Soviet troops have been reduced unilaterally by half a million servicemen. Besides, troops are being withdrawn from Eastern Europe and accordingly the sites under verification are reducing.

Incidentally, in the first 44 months over 600 American inspections will be held on Soviet territory while the Soviet side will have none on American territory. This is stipulated by the treaty and it is the American, mind you, not Soviet representatives who are indignant.

Now take the tanks. Yes, they were transferred beyond the Urals, but which of them? Those that were redundant as a result of the unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces in 1989-90, those which became redundant during the transfer of our divisions to the defensive structure. There are quite a few of them—about 10,000. Besides, the divisions and regiments withdrawn from Eastern Europe to the Asian part of the Soviet Union were moved beyond the Urals with their tanks and other machinery. This was carried out before the signing of the treaty in Paris.

It is interesting that some participants in the talks recognized these actions as lawful and not contradicting the document while other quarters are expressing their dissatisfaction. Well, everything can, especially in the framework of such large-scale reductions of armaments and it would be better not to exchange reproaches. The road of purpose-oriented talks and compromises which the sides chose for concluding the Paris agreement may prove correct also for the lifting of the current distrust, concludes Col. Solovev.

U.S. Envoy Criticizes Reports on Reducing Forces

PM1302115791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel General N. Chervov: "Ambassador J. Matlock Rejects False Report"]

[Text] On 30 January THE WASHINGTON POST published an article by R. Evans and R. Novak entitled "Red Army Show of Strength." The article indicates in particular that in December 1990 the USSR Armed Forces General Staff allegedly told Mr. J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, that the "the military does not recognize the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe because it was concluded by the Foreign Ministry, which was headed at that time by E. Shevardnadze." The article goes on to say that the General Staff has "instructed its representatives at the

strategic arms talks to reject quite an important part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which had almost been agreed by E. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State J. Baker in Houston."

These two events, the article indicates, were supposedly "the chief factors in E. Shevardnadze's dramatic resignation and President G. Bush's decision to 'postpone' the summit with M.S. Gorbachev."

The journalists Evans and Novak are renowned for their libel and slander not only in the United States. But in this case it is a question of high-level political provocation. The article is based on brazen lies from beginning to end and is designed to undermine the trust that has been established in Soviet-U.S. relations and to set the Soviet political and military leaderships against one another.

In order to lend conviction to their lie, Evans and Novak resorted to forgery, citing the authority of J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. But the truth will come out. Here is what U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock wrote in an official letter to Army General M.A. Moiseyev:

"I was appalled to read a false report in the American press alleging you told me in December that the USSR Armed Forces General Staff would not honor the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. You and I both know that no such conversation took place.... I believe that the importance of this treaty and of U.S.-Soviet relations in general demand both a prompt public response and assurance to you that this erroneous article does not represent our understanding of your position on the CFE Treaty."

What can I say in conclusion? There are obviously certain forces at work in the United States that would like to do everything possible to cast doubt on the new trusting relations between Moscow and Washington and between Presidents M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush and to return the world to the times of confrontation and "cold war."

This time the ill-intentioned attack by THE WASHINGTON POST writers rebounded against them. But the forces guiding their hand will hardly rest content with that.

CFE Consultative Group Plenary Session Held

LD1302050291 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT
12 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, February 13 (TASS)—The joint consultative group of experts from 22 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries held a plenary meeting in the Austrian capital on Tuesday.

The group aims to promote the solution of practical issues necessary to realize the treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]. This was the second session of the group, an important factor in forming a new Europe.

The group continued specifying initial data on conventional armed forces. They also discussed issues concerning the conventional arms in Europe treaty, particularly the interpretation of its articles about counting conventional arms.

Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, heading the Soviet delegation, said in his speech that weapons in the Navy, Marines and Coastal Guard are not included in the treaty on quantitative reductions, as they are part of the naval forces, which, according to the Vienna talks mandate are not taken into consideration.

The same could be said about Strategic Missile Forces, also having conventional arms used to protect strategic missile launchers, he said.

Western representatives insisted that the above mentioned weapons be included in the treaty.

Local observers believe that differences are rather serious and considerable efforts will be needed. The group agreed to continue work.

Falin on Troop Withdrawal From Germany

LD1302143891 Berlin ADN in German 1249 GMT
13 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Hamburg (ADN)—In the 14 February edition of STERN to be published this Thursday, Valentin Falin, the head of the International Relations Department of the CPSU Central Committee, promises that perestroika will continue and all commitments to Germany will be kept. For Falin, the fact that the two-plus-four treaty has not yet been ratified by the Supreme Soviet is a "normal process." At the moment, the deputies are inspecting the treaty. They have the right to do so.

In the interview, Falin confirms the schedule for the withdrawal of the over 300,000 Soviet soldiers stationed in Germany. "We have made the decision to withdraw all Soviet soldiers from foreign territories. This is in line with the fundamental change in our military doctrine." If the conditions are good, the withdrawal can be implemented sooner than planned.

Falin says claims that the withdrawal will be slowed down if Bonn does not pay more than the 12.5 billion Deutsch marks already agreed are ill-considered. He assumes "that the commitments will be kept." He stresses that the Supreme Soviet does not want changes, new treaties, or more money. Falin says: "The deputies want to be informed in detail before they say yes or no. It will take time to make it clear that these treaties mean additional security." [passage omitted]

Reports Continue on Troop Withdrawals From Poland

Poles Propose Early Withdrawal

PM1302171191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item from column of IZVESTIYA news agency reports: "On the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops From Poland"]

[Text] A Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman has termed "too protracted" a period lasting until mid-1994 for withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland. This proposal was made by the Soviet side in Warsaw during the fourth round of bilateral talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The ministry spokesman stated that Soviet troops must leave sooner. At the same time, he said that Warsaw has a flexible approach to its demand that Soviet troops quit Polish territory before the end of this year.

Proposal Called 'Unrealistic'

LD1302150391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1915 GMT 12 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Galkin]

[Text] Warsaw, 12 February (TASS)—Our talks are going successfully. Both sides have made small steps to meet each other. This is how V.A. Kopteltsev, leader of the Soviet delegation and deputy chief of the Second European Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the fourth round of talks between Soviet and Polish experts on preparing agreements on withdrawing Soviet troops from the Republic of Poland and the transit of military units from Germany, which is taking place in Warsaw.

He described the timetable initially proposed by Poland as unrealistic, however, for purely objective reasons unconnected with Soviet good will. Their proposal is to withdraw the troops before the end of this year. We understand Poland's aspiration for our troops to leave the country no later than our troops leave Germany. We have started the process. At the current talks we have put forward a proposal which is a step toward meeting these desires, noted V.A. Kopteltsev.

Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski received the leaders of the Soviet and Polish delegations today.

The talks will be continued.

May Make Withdrawal Longer

LD1402053191 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The latest, fourth round of Soviet-Polish talks on the withdrawal of Soviet forces located on Poland's soil ended in Warsaw today.

[Correspondent Yu. Ulyanov] Poland is at present the only Warsaw Pact member country with which to date no agreement has been signed on the withdrawal of our forces. What is going on then? From the very outset the Soviet side proposed that military subunits be withdrawn from Poland after our troops leave the former GDR territory. Previously the Polish Government adopted an understanding attitude to this, evidently then fearing to some extent its powerful western neighbor. Then the Polish-German treaty on borders was signed and Poland's position changed immediately.

President Walesa, and then Prime Minister Bielecki, too, have been insisting on Soviet forces leaving Poland first, that is, even before the end of 1991. Then it is said the transit of Soviet military subunits from Germany can begin. The Polish press has even begun to calculate the possible profits of this action. We can receive between \$2-3 billion from the Soviet Union for the transit, GAZETA WYBORCZA said.

The more complicated internal situation in the Soviet Union and a difference between the positions of the sides have been the reason why to this day there is no agreement.

[Ulyanov] What has the present round of talks yielded?

[Kopteltsev] On the whole this round has been successful. It may even be said that both sides took small steps toward each other. I think that our country and our people may proceed on the basis that the interests of the Soviet Union will be properly protected.

[Ulyanov] Poland's firm position, TRYBUNA says, enables our authorities to gain points within the country since it agrees with the mood of the public. At the same time, however, it is making the main goal more distant—the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

Talks Seen as Inconclusive

LD1402092391 Moscow World Service in English
2200 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Text] The fourth round of Soviet-Polish talks in Warsaw on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland has ended without definite results. A Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman has disclosed that the negotiators also discussed the transit across Poland of Soviet troops being evacuated from Germany. The sides considered the legal status of the forces being pulled out of Germany for the period of their transportation through Polish territory. No agreement was reached on a timetable for the pull-out of the Soviet troops in Poland, which insists on completing the evacuation by the end of this year. The Soviet Union regards the middle of 1994 as the only possible withdrawal deadline.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Expert Urges Ban on Attacking Chemical Dumps

Said To Violate 1925 Geneva Protocol

PM1302161991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[“UN Expert’s Opinion” by I. Yevstafyev, UN expert in the investigation of instances of use of chemical weapons: “Chemical Attack and Nuclear Retaliation?”]

[Text] Alarming reports are still coming in from the Persian Gulf about the continuing war between the U.S and allied armed forces and Iraq. The number of casualties of this armed conflict, the largest since World War II in terms of the number of combatants, is rising on both sides.

Let us recall how the combat operations against Iraq started. An air operation involving U.S., British, French, Italian, and Saudi Air Forces was the main component of the first day’s operations. Troop and weapons control centers, air defense systems, airfields, missile bases, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons research centers, and installations producing and storing toxic agents and munitions were the targets of the first massive air attack.

The choice of control centers, air defense systems, airfields, and missile bases as top-priority targets is quite understandable from the military viewpoint. Any war is waged above all against the enemy’s armed forces and victory in a war is secured by destroying its army. But, at the same time, from the humane and legal viewpoints, the advisability of attacking installations with military-chemical potential is arousing serious doubt.

It can be asserted unequivocally that allied efforts to destroy these installations could result in the peaceful Iraqi population’s suffering the mass effect of toxic agents. According to specialists, the destruction by conventional weapons of a chemical air bomb dump containing 200-500 tonnes of such toxins as sarin and tabun would affect the population for several tens of kilometers around. In that case, is there a fundamental difference between the output of toxic agents from a bombed dump and the use of chemical weapons by the attacking side as the cause of these people’s deaths? So, the destruction of chemical and biological installations using conventional weapons may be equated with chemical warfare primarily against the civilian population.

I would remind you that the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of chemical weapons in war. The United States ratified this protocol in 1975, as did Britain, France, and Italy. At the Paris conference quite recently all the coalition states once again pledged not to use chemical weapons and solemnly confirmed this pledge. But to all intents and purposes an attack on an enemy’s military-chemical installations is a breach if not of the letter then of the spirit of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

This constitutes a provocation to chemical warfare. The next step in provocation might be the coalition forces' use of irritants, which do not formally come under the term "chemical weapons." Talk of using irritants has already begun. Perhaps some people are in fact very interested in provoking Iraq to use chemical weapons?

At the same time let us ask ourselves the following question: Do Iraqi chemical weapons really pose a serious threat to the coalition's combat units? No, they do not and have not posed such a threat from the very outset. Specialists' analysis shows that, given Iraq's real capability to dedicate chemical weapons delivery vehicles and these weapons' specifications, and in view of the real level of the coalition troops' chemical defense, a possible Iraqi chemical attack on the coalition's forces would not be very effective and would have no effect on combat operations. This would have been true even if Iraq's chemical weapons dumps and production facilities had not been attacked during the first strike. U.S. specialists could not help but reach this forecast, and I dismiss any possibility of their drawing other conclusions.

It is all the more unclear, then, why the coalition is striving so insistently to destroy suspected chemical and biological weapons storage installations on Iraqi territory. Perhaps these attacks were planned in advance, to provoke Iraq into the only kind of chemical attack in which massive human casualties would be inevitable—a chemical missile attack on cities. Followed by the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq in "retaliation," with the same justification as at the time of Hiroshima—"to avert U.S. losses."

That is why the international community should immediately and unequivocally condemn methods of fighting a war that cause or may cause mass fatalities among the peaceful population and may light the fuse for chemical or nuclear war. Considering that existing legal norms do not formally regard as chemical warfare conventional weapons attacks aimed at destroying military-chemical installations, international legal norms banning attacks on chemically dangerous installations—not only chemical weapons dumps but also stores containing industrial toxic chemicals, chemical plants, and oil tanks—in the course of a war should be formulated and adopted as a matter of urgency.

The need for these legal norms to be formulated is also extremely pressing for the Soviet Union—and not only because war is blazing alongside our borders today. The point is that accords were secured within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and in the course of bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks on questions of banning chemical arms whereby the sides exchanged data on their military-chemical potential's quantitative and qualitative indicators. They declared their chemical weapons stocks, the types and quantity of toxic agents and chemical munitions, and chemical weapons production and storage sites. I will not now broach the question of the progress made in concluding an all-embracing

convention on banning chemical weapons as a result of this exchange. It is my personal opinion that nothing resulted from this exchange. But experience of the Gulf conflict shows that in the event of war military-chemical installations will be targets of the first attack. Yet talks and the exchange of information regarding arms specifications are not only conducted in the sphere of chemical weapons.

It can of course be said that the United States has given us this kind of information. But the United States is a long way from the regions of instability, and it is unlikely that anyone could inflict a destructive attack on its military-chemical installations. Whereas the Soviet Union must be interested in the urgent formulation and adoption of international legal norms precluding attacks on military-chemical installations in the course of armed conflicts.

This formulation of the question should meet with the full backing of the peoples of Europe, on whose territory there are more than 200 nuclear reactors, thousands of major chemical enterprises, and tens of thousands of dumps storing fuel and toxic agents. If there is no ban on attacking industrial chemical installations, a military conflict in Europe and other industrially developed regions would become a chemical war despite any bans on the use of chemical weapons. A convention banning chemical weapons and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles—talks on the elaboration of which have been under way for ten years in Geneva—is pointless if the destruction of chemical installations using conventional weapons is not banned in war.

We must now draw another conclusion from the Gulf conflict. We must not reveal information during any disarmament and arms reduction talks that may be used—even in theory—to the detriment of our country's population in the future. Ultimately conventions are formulated to boost our people's security. An international agreement banning inadmissible means of waging war is nonetheless a thing of the future. The destruction of the Iraqi people and the Gulf ecosphere should be stopped today, along with the attempts to provoke chemical and nuclear war.

The Gulf war should be stopped immediately, with no preliminary conditions on either side. The states which opened the way to war with the UN Security Council decision should stop the world's advance toward apocalypse.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments

LD0802150791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1412 GMT 8 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 8 February (TASS)—Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, has shared the anxiety over the strikes by

the multinational forces against chemical installations in Iraq, which was expressed in an article published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA today under the title "A Chemical Strike and a Nuclear Response?"

Speaking at a briefing today, the diplomat agreed with the opinion of the author of the article, Major General Igor Yevstafyev, that strikes against such installations should be banned in the context of international law. The situation around Iraq's chemical and nuclear installations is being followed in the USSR, he said.

Vitaliy Churkin then reported that on 5 February the U.S. secretary of state passed information on to the USSR foreign minister which said: "Strikes had been inflicted against Iraqi installations for the production of combat poisonous materials (PM), chemical ammunition supply installations, and PM dumps. To prevent chemical pollution the means of destruction were chosen very carefully. There have been no reports or evidence of instances of chemical pollution".

Going back to the article itself, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman criticized the position of the author who opposes an exchange of data on the quantitative and qualitative indices of chemical-warfare potential, and who is also totally opposed to the disclosure at any talks of information which, as the paper points out, "could be used in the future even in principle for inflicting damage on the population of our country."

Vitaliy Churkin stated, among other things, that "such a formulation would not allow for any information at all to be exchanged, but openness of military activity, as experience has shown, has been a powerful motivating force at disarmament talks, including those on chemical weapons." The diplomat added that at the talks on chemical weapons this exchange is being carried out on a strictly confidential basis with a commitment to nondisclosure.

Vitaliy Churkin also described as "provocative" a claim by the author of the article that Iraq's "only alternative" was "a missile chemical strike on cities." At the same time the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman cast doubts on the legitimacy of the article being attributed to the opinion of a UN expert. According to the diplomat, the name Yevstafyev does figure in a list of experts passed on by the Soviet Union to the UN Secretariat, but this list has not been officially confirmed and the author of the publication has not once been a part of any United Nations investigations.

USSR's Batsanov Elected Chairman of Geneva CW Committee

*LD1402194191 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT
14 Feb 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vitaliy Makarchev]

[Text] Geneva, February 14 (TASS)—Head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference

Sergey Batsanov was today elected chairman of the special chemical weapons [CW] committee, a prestigious body of the conference. He replaced a Swedish diplomat at this post.

In an interview with TASS, Batsanov noted that he sees his task as committee chairman to achieve a qualitative breakthrough in drafting a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, eliminating their stockpiles and completing the talks by the end of the present or, in any case, early next year.

"A qualitative breakthrough means the achievement of true security of states," Batsanov noted. This call for, above all, the complete destruction of chemical weapons, the full prohibition of chemical arms use and inspection by request.

Batsanov also singled out assistance in protecting future convention signatories, who have no chemical arms, against these mass destruction weapons. "I want to make active efforts in these areas," he noted.

Regrettably, the Gulf war "somewhat decelerates" the activities of delegations, Batsanov noted. At the same time all recognise that developments in the Gulf and the growing threat of the use of chemical weapons prompt the need to agree and conclude the convention as soon as possible.

"It seems to me that top-level efforts to ban chemical weapons worldwide should blend well with the new security structures which will emerge after the end of the war," Batsanov stressed.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Finalizing CW Ban

*LD1502174291 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT
15 Feb 91*

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow, February 15 (TASS)—The Soviet Union intends to do everything it can to quickly finalize the world convention banning chemical weapons [CW]. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today, referring to the resolution in Geneva of multilateral talks on the subject."

He noted that the Gulf war, where the actual threat of the use of chemical weapons is high, has shown the world the pressing need to solve the problem.

The Soviet spokesman said considerable headway has been made at the Geneva talks and expressed confidence that the convention would be ready for final approval this year.

"In this connection, the Soviet Union supports the convocation of a special session of the disarmament conference at the foreign ministerial level to resolve a whole package of remaining problems, Churkin said.

For the first time a Soviet diplomat, Sergey Batsanov, was elected chairman of the Special Committee of the Conference on Chemical Weapons. Churkin stressed that the election reflected not only the recognition of the

role played by the Soviet Union in the talks on chemical disarmament but also vested in the Soviet Union major responsibility before the world community for the prompt working out of a multilateral convention.

AUSTRIA

Eight Firms Suspected of Sanctions Violations

91WP0062Z Vienna DER STANDARD in German
22 Jan 91 p 13

[Article by Lydia Ninz: "Iraq Embargo: Public Prosecutor Investigates"]

[Text] Eight Austrian firms were reported to the police by the Ministry of Economics. They are suspected of having violated the trade embargoes imposed on Iraq and Kuwait since August, and having delivered goods to those countries.

Although minister Schuessel, upon inquiry by DER STANDARD, confirmed the reports to the police, he was not to be drawn out about details as to the number and names of the suspects. Only this much: "I have given orders that the suspicious circumstances reported here and abroad be directly passed on to the state prosecutors."

It nevertheless leaked out that statements of the facts of the case were lodged against, among others, the Styrian Tieber trading company, the Viennese "Stalco" firm, and LIM headquartered in the Burgenland. The Ministry of Justice has handed the matter over to the state prosecutors.

The manager of Stalco, Iraqi Dhia Aziz Ghanni, was stabbed to death by his compatriot Hammed Abdul Hassan in Vienna in July. The firm, a subsidiary of the Hamburg Stalco Industrieanlagen GmbH, is suspected of being a cover firm of the Iraqi secret service.

On Schuessel's list appears once again Oskar Schmidt's firm, LIM, against which a criminal complaint was lodged a year ago because of suspected illegal arms exports to Iraq.

The "overseas trader" (according to TREND, Schmidt's self-description) lately created a media furor not only because a business deal worth 237 million schillings went bust—a tire factory was to be built near Baghdad. Schmidt also made headlines with lucrative real estate deals (Palais Harrach).

Tieber is a Styrian trading company with 22 employees which supplies spare parts for machinery, and also chemicals. Helmut Sammer, authorized signatory, dismisses the complaint as "nonsense." "We strictly observe the embargo, we do not even have an exchange of letters with Iraq," he protested upon inquiry by DER STANDARD. A responsible manager of the firm accompanied Waldheim on his latest trip to the Gulf region.

"Those guys still owe us a total of 60 million schillings from the past, which are in part covered by the control bank. We would be crazy to provide supplies illegally and without reinsurance by the control bank," says Sammer indignantly.

In the case of chemical supplies (mainly for water purification), the company, already in the inquiry stage, examines whether they could be used to produce chemical weapons.

The managers risk jail terms of up to two years, or fines up to 360 daily rates. It would be even worse if they had infringed not only against the embargo, but also against the war materiel law with arms exports.

Since August, an ordinance by Schuessel prohibits supplying Iraq and Kuwait with goods. Specifically prohibited are not only weapons exports, which require a license anyway, but also supplies of pants buttons, for instance.

"With our liberal foreign trade regime, we are not in a position to oversee observance of this ordinance," admits Schuessel. "Except in the unlikely event of the firms' declaring Iraq and Kuwait as target countries. We must leave it to the state prosecutors to examine suspicious circumstances."

By contrast, only two weeks ago Schuessel's ministry claimed that the problem was under control. "The trade embargo is being observed 100 percent," DER STANDARD was told by ministry officials upon inquiry.

According to Schuessel, hints of suspicion regarding embargo violations came from abroad as well as at home. The present list must not be confused with U.S. senator Jesse Helms' "watch list" made public a few months ago, in which, based on media reports, he also listed 13 domestic companies which allegedly supplied Iraq, just before the embargo, with weapons or related installations.

FRANCE

Assistance to Iraqi Scud Program Described

91P40135A Paris L'EXPRESS in French 8 Feb 91
p 10-12

[Text] French intelligence services have launched an investigation into the accusations made by Eliyahu Ben-Elisar, president of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee the day following the first explosion of a Scud missile in Tel Aviv: "France is largely responsible for the current Iraqi ability to launch ballistic missiles against Israel." This allegation is being taken very seriously. The president of the Republic responded indirectly to this statement during his 20 January press conference by saying, "We have not sold any ballistic missile capable of reaching Israeli territory." This is true but does not constitute an adequate response to the accusations that Ben-Elisar made shortly afterwards to LE FIGARO: "Certain French companies have furnished hightechnology mechanisms which have allowed the Iraqis to upgrade their original Scuds so that their range now includes Israel."

Such accusations cannot stand without a response as long as sirens are sounding day and night in Israel and in Saudi Arabia, terrifying the populace. The statements of Thierry de Beaure, the president's emissary, who remarked that "the question didn't even come up" after his interview with the prime minister in Jerusalem on 25 January, are scarcely credible and are even somewhat disturbing. All the more so since Lutz Stavenhagen, minister of state in the chancellor's office, when faced with the same accusations, admitted that in 1986 and 1987 German companies had assisted Iraq in increasing the range of its Scuds, thereby contributing to the proliferation of ground-to-ground and air-launched missiles, as well as of chemical warheads carried by these missiles.

It is unfortunately a known fact that French companies have done likewise. How and why?

Since the 1980's, we have seen an acceleration of this proliferation; over 20 Third World countries now have ballistic missiles. William Webster, CIA director, estimates that in the year 2000, about 15 of these countries will be capable of producing their own missiles through technology transfer. A confidential report, written in January 1988 and named "Discriminate Deterrence" [preceding two words in English], even raises the hypothesis of a ballistic attack on the United States by Third World countries, and analyzes its consequences.

Without a doubt, the Iran-Iraq war materialized the threat: Over a thousand ballistic missiles were launched by the two countries, including several hundreds during the "city wars" in February and March 1988. This was the moment of triumph of a Soviet missile, the SS-1, whose code name in the West is Scud. With a range of 280 km, the Soviet Union generously distributed the Scud B in Middle Eastern countries. But it was the Iraqis who would intensively deploy these missiles, having received the first deliveries in the 1970's. They received some 500 by the end of the war, including 350 delivered between 1986 and 1988. The Iraqis were the first to use the missiles, starting in mid-1982, when they increased their range after having been forced to retreat. Saddam Husayn then attempted to upgrade his arsenal in order to reach Tehran and other more distant Iranian cities, such as Qom and Esfahan. The project was given to General Amir Hammudi al-Sa'di, minister of industry, in charge of developing military production. He is the father of the Iraqi ballistic missile and chemical weapons program. He is also the one who organized the clandestine network for gathering technology in developed countries. On 3 August 1987, the first launch of an upgraded Scud B missile, called the al-Husayn, took place; the missile fell 615 km from its launch site. The al-Husayn, with a maximum range of 650 km, is a lengthened Scud (12.2 meters), in order to carry more liquid fuel, carries a 500 kg charge (1 tonne for the Scud B), and is accurate within 1,000 meters. More than 160 al-Husayns were launched on Tehran between late February and mid-April 1988.

The completion of the al-Husayn owes a great deal to two projects. An Egyptian project, under the aegis of the Sakr

company and conducted from 1983 on with the assistance of the French company SNPE (National Company for Powders and Explosives), resulted in the Sakr 80 missile. The other project, much more complex, has been directed since 1984 by Egypt and Argentina. CITEFA (Armed Forces Scientific and Technical Research Center of Argentina) presented in 1985 a missile with "civilian applications"—the Condor 1, whose characteristics resemble those of a ground-to-ground missiles with a 100-km range. On 20 December, the Argentine defense minister announced officially that Argentina and Egypt were developing "a medium-range missile with civilian applications"—the Condor 2 (the Badr 2000 for the Egyptians). This missile, as later revealed by the Ushuaia naval base commander, has the same range as "the distance between the Malvinas [Falklands] and Argentina." In fact, in this project, Argentina was intended to serve as a screen to link the work of private European companies. And that is precisely what Argentina did by forming a secret consortium of 16 companies, named "Consen" that was based first in Monaco, then in Switzerland, and represented the latest in missile technology and equipment. Aside from the German firm MBB (Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm), the Italian Snia-BPD, a subsidiary of Fiat, and the Swedish Bofors, is the French Sagem. This company, which specializes in optronics and guidance systems, produces inertia guidance systems. This system—which three countries in the world are capable of producing—is based on a gyroscope that enables the missile to maintain a fixed reference point in space, thereby increasing its precision. This is its brain. Among other equipment, Sagem makes the inertia guidance systems that equip the French SNLE (nuclear submarine-launched missiles) and is cultivating foreign markets. It came to participate in the Condor 2 project by supplying Argentina with just over 40 MSD 80 inertia guidance systems, of which some went to Iraq. Western and Israeli intelligence services only got wind of the Condor 2 project after the successful launch of its first missile (504 km) in Patagonia in early March 1989. In the meantime, Iraq, which had supplied most of the \$5 billion needed for the undertaking, had taken advantage of the technological spin-offs, because on 25 April 1988, the al-'Abbas, another upgraded version of the Scud B, was tested at a distance of 850 km, attained by lengthening it 13.3 meters and reducing the charge to 300 kg, for a [target] precision of under 1,500 meters. (These are the missiles currently falling on Tel Aviv and Riyadh.)

It is certain that, from the end of the war with Iran, the Iraqis decided to develop an increasingly autonomous production. The ballistic missile development project, cited in a special report by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, bears the code name "Project 395" and includes the following four projects: the Saad 16 research and development complex, directed by German and Austrian companies, near Mosul; a missile manufacturing center near al-Fallujah; the "Project 96" solid fuel production center at al-Hillah, 17 km from Baghdad (a violent

explosion in August 1989 killed several Egyptian workers); and the An-Anbar Space Research Center, built in the desert near Karbala.

The missile training for the Iraqi technicians at An-Anbar was held in Brazil by CTA (Brazilian Aerospace Technology Center). According to experts, this assistance in the form of technical training proved to be decisive in starting up the Iraqi ballistic program. A French company from Toulouse, Intespace, built and now directs the Brazilian laboratories where these Iraqi technicians were trained. Intespace is a company whose shareholders include CNES [National Center for Space Studies], the Aerospace Materiel and Equipment Improvement Company (a subsidiary of SNECMA), Aerospatiale, Matra-Espace, and Alcatel-Espace. The keystone of the Brazilian space program is the Sonda 4 rocket, produced with the assistance of both German and French technology. Sagem supplies the guidance system, and, in 1988 and 1989, Intespace laboratories conducted large-scale tests to perfect the upper stages of the rocket. From this launcher, Brazil started the design of military missiles with two companies, Orbita and Avibras. In May 1987, Iraq began negotiations to purchase SS-300 Avibras missiles, derived from the Sonda 4. The negotiations failed, probably because at that time, the Iraqis were on the verge of successfully launching the al-Husayn, of comparable capabilities.

American specialists are convinced that there was a transfer of technology between France and Iraq using Brazil as intermediary. Sagem has been called on the carpet, accused of supplying inertia guidance systems, as well as Intespace, which provided training for the Iraqi technicians and did studies for the preliminary stages of the space projects, and CNES, which signed space cooperation agreements for the installation of the Alcantara launch site and is also participating in the Brazilians' project for launching an observation satellite. And this, at the same time when the Iraqis have just asked the Brazilians to do "a feasibility study for a military observation satellite system"! But the most controversial element of Franco-Brazilian cooperation happened in the summer of 1989. Within the framework of the negotiations between SEP (European Propulsion Company), Arianespace, and the Brazilian Space Agency, there was a direct transfer of space technology: SEP's liquid-fuel Viking motor. The Americans were violently opposed to the project and called into question an alliance between Embraer (Brazil), SEP, and Aerospatiale which they say intends to effect a transfer of technology, in spite of everything.

These accusations have some justification. The Iraqis are eagerly seeking a number of indispensable components from French companies. Their necessary intermediary is a small company on Avenue Marceau whose owner is in the habit of taking trips to Baghdad and was even wounded on the Iran-Iraq front. Their finance company is Montana Investissement [Montana Investments], a Panamanian company with Iraqi capital that is a shareholder in Hachette.

At the same time, Egyptian officials were making a demarche in Paris with Sagem for an order of nearly 200 MSD-80 inertia guidance systems. Sagem supplied them with five for use in testing. Mysteriously warned about this, an Israeli diplomat made a demarche with Remy Pautrat, domestic security advisor at the prime minister's office, to warn the French Government that in reality the order was destined for Iraq. The French then offered their "clients" some MSL-800 guidance systems that were of lesser quality and were more affected by speed and noise. The Egyptians did not pursue the matter.

In fact, current Israeli accusations appear to bear on a missile performance upgrade regarding their propulsion rather than guidance systems. French companies reportedly also contributed to improvements in the reliability and power of the motors that equip the modified Scuds. "French know-how on this subject is better than the Germans," a specialist emphasized. Does this mean that other companies—or even the same ones—have also supplied motor components with special alloys or coatings that require advanced fibre or ceramic technology?

The investigation by specialized services should clarify the subject. Now, the French contribution seems undeniable even if it is difficult to precisely outline it in the confusion of collaborations that Iraq has profited from. At any rate, this contribution goes beyond the addition of a few rocket motor components. The real problem is that of ballistic missile proliferation. It is likely that the measures aimed at preventing proliferation will be strengthened in the next few years. Such measures already exist and were made public on 16 April 1987 by seven countries—Germany, Great Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Italy, and the United States—with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

After three years of existence, one can see the results! The MTCR explicitly authorizes the transfer of technology and space equipment but solely for civilian purposes. However, the boundary is very difficult to define in this area. All the more so given that, if current space technology leaders developed civilian projects based on military experiments, Third World countries are today doing exactly the opposite.

Defense Minister Warns Iraq on Use of Chemical Weapons

LD1102102591 Paris Domestic Service in French
0700 GMT 11 Feb 91

[Statement by Pierre Joxe; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Pierre Joxe last highlighted the role of France in the allied coalition on TF-1 Television Network. The defense minister said the land offensive against Iraq will be the subject of consultation between President Bush and his main allies. Pierre Joxe also justified the refusal of France to resort to chemical weapons:

[Begin Joxe recording] Our parents and we as children feared chemical war and we thought chemical war was finished. In fact, international treaties signed by France, as well as by Iraq and more than a hundred countries in the world, ban the use of chemical weapons. France chose not to have chemical weapons. If Iraq thinks it can treat the coalition's forces like it treated those unfortunate Kurds who were gased in their village, or the troops of the Iranian army sometimes consisting of children, it will make a big mistake. So, the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi army would be an extremely serious phenomenon, more at a political level—one can almost say philosophical level—than a military level. This is why France has several times warned Iraqi military leaders that those who use chemical weapons—and they could be allowed by their superior command—will take personal responsibility. Their military dividends will not be worth it. It is not through the use of chemical weapons that Iraq can try or hope to resist for a long time. [end recording]

GERMANY

Peace Groups' Evidence of Mid-East Arms Sales

91GE0148A Munich SUEddeutsche ZEITUNG
in German 2 Feb 91 p 10

[Article by Stephan-Andreas Casdorff: "Suitable for Killing, Unsuitable for an Indictment?"]

[Text] The Consumer Initiative, registered association [Verbraucherinitiative e.V.], with headquarters in Bonn, is a nonprofit consumer protection organization. It offers information about everyday environmentally and health-conscious behavior, and represents the interests of the consumer. It is politically independent and has about 8,000 members. This organization has become involved with the Gulf war: In the future, it will increasingly concern itself with information on the subject of "awareness in buying and military production" and to pass this on to the consumers, for example regarding armament companies and arms exporters that also produce consumer goods or receive contracts from public authorities.

The information leaflet of the Consumer Initiative leaves nothing to be desired in clarity. "The war in the Gulf not only demands victims; there are also winners. Among them are the companies that delivered the necessary weapons to Iraq or other countries. As long as Iraq represented Western interests, Saddam Husayn's regime was exceedingly well supplied with Western arms. Those who produce and sell these weapons are by no means shadowy figures and dubious enterprises. They are honorable managers. The creme de la creme of Western German industry shared in the profits from the business with Iraq." The information leaflet lists them:

There is, for example, Siemens AG: This group, which is owned by the Siemens family as well as 500,000 stockholders and with its subsidiaries manufactures refrigerators or telephones, computers or light bulbs, according to information from the Consumer Initiative, delivered "control instruments for a gun factory, precision lathes, and an anechoic chamber for missile research." One of the subsidiaries of Siemens is Kraftwerksunion (KWF); under the category "Deliveries to Iraq," the entry written by the consumer initiative for this company is simply "Nuclear Technology."

Long List of Suppliers

Daimler-Benz as well found its way into the archive of the Consumer Initiative. Daimler-Benz delivered thousands of military vehicles and made available the engines for armored vehicles for the Iraqi Army. Among the subsidiaries of the Daimler-Benz group is AEG, known for its dishwashers, ovens, microwave ovens, vacuum cleaners, office equipment—its "deliveries" to Iraq, according to the organization's list, were "arms and a munitions production plant." MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm] and Dornier, both combined into Deutsche Aerospace AG, after having been bought by Daimler-Benz, are also listed, as are Zeiss and Thyssen—the creme de la creme.

Even television viewers were treated to a German contribution to Iraqi military power: For a few seconds the first pictures of allied air attacks on Baghdad showed the Roland antiaircraft missile system stationed there; it is a joint German-French production. Without technical help from Germans and German companies, Iraq would not have been able to launch Scud missiles against Israel and the Saudi capital, Riyadh. The original missiles of Soviet manufacture did not have enough range for that. The German armament industry is always involved: Openly recognizable as a supplier of complete weapon systems and equipment, and in a concealed manner as the manufacturer of many Iraqi arms enterprises.

Article 26 of the Basic Law reads: "Activities tending and undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offense." Horst Eymann of the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] was chairman of the parliamentary investigating committee, which during the previous legislative period was to clear up the illegal delivery of submarine blueprints to South Africa. He stated in a situation report on 21 June 1988: "The activities to be investigated by the committee clearly showed that legal uncertainties exist with respect to the export of engineering data/construction data for military weapons and transmission of the pertinent know-how. It is possible that the regulations also are not sufficient to assure that obligations assumed with respect to international law can be adhered to within national law." Despite this recognition, during the following period a tightening of the foreign trade and military weapon control law was initially delayed. However, a review of

the regulations was finally undertaken in the last legislative period, under the impression of the Libyan-German affair involving a poison gas factory in Rabta. In the end, however, the original draft was watered down.

Fruitless SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Inquiries

Norbert Gansel, the new deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, has—together with the Greens—constantly demanded tighter export controls. It was also he who in recent years repeatedly asked about German deliveries to Iraq, but always in vain. This was the case in 1984, for example: When Gansel wanted to know whether reports were accurate that Iraq, with the cooperation of the Karl Kolb and Pilot Plant Engineering firms, had received production facilities for poison gas from Germany, the then minister of state of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alois Mertes (CDU), replied that this involved a facility for plant pesticides, which could not be used to produce nerve gas. In 1988 Gansel requested information about whether it was true that German missile technicians in Iraq had modernized the Soviet Scud missiles to such an extent that, with a range of 900 kilometers, they could now hit Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The parliamentary state secretary from the Ministry of Economics, Erich Riedl (CSU [Christian Social Union]), replied that it was apparently a matter of missiles for the air defense of Baghdad.

Gansel remained uncomfortable and became the target of violent attacks by the governing CDU/CSU and FDP coalition. This past Thursday, the new issue of *BILD-ZEITUNG* had a big headline: "Norbert Gansel—the Man Who Was Right." That same day Heinrich Lummer, a right-winger in the CDU caucus, declared that it is now "high time" to draw the consequences of the discussion about Germany's role in the arms export to Iraq, which has done tremendous damage to the country's image. Lummer demanded that national arms exports should be regulated on the international level—within the framework of NATO, because the "sensitive subject" of arms exports was not consistent with "any nation going it alone." The Union politician is pushing for a "safe country" list, in which the Western alliance designates those nations "to which deliveries can be made without problems." In addition to that, in Lummer's opinion, there should be a "continuously reviewed list of threshold nations and Third World nations, for which arms exports are to be made dependent on whether they can be regarded as stable, Western-oriented democracies."

There are not quite 17 million inhabitants in Iraq. The question of how a relatively small nation, with a population figure roughly equivalent to that of the former GDR, can have one of the largest and technically best equipped armies in the world, is comparatively simple to answer. Over the past 10 to 12 years, more than 40 countries supplied the Saddam Husayn regime. With about 40 percent of the world market share, the Near East has for many years been the principal marketing

region for arms of all kinds. Iraq alone, according to information from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, has imported military supplies for approximately 80 billion dollars over the last 10 years. This made it the world's largest arms importer.

Iraq has regularly used more than 30 percent of its gross social product for military spending since 1980. By comparison, in Germany it is about 2.5 percent. In 1987 the share of imported military goods, compared to Iraq's total imports, amounted to 75 percent. Third World nations spend an average of seven percent on these. Furthermore, it must also be taken into account that agriculture and civilian industrial production have been neglected due to the eight-year war with Iran, and that 75 percent of all foods and nearly all high-quality industrial goods must therefore be imported. One can imagine the consequences for the Iraqi population. In addition, during the war with Iran, the currency reserves were used up. The result of this is that Iraq is heavily in debt abroad.

The Federal Republic, long Iraq's second largest trading partner, delivered 700 million dollars worth of military goods to Iraq during the period from 1983 to 1987, according to information from ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency], the U.S. disarmament agency. This made it one of the five largest arms suppliers to dictator Saddam Husayn. The above-mentioned sum, however, includes, for example, so-called "dual-use" goods, meaning products with both civilian and military application, only partially—and not at all the military goods resulting from German-French cooperation, exported to Iraq via France, Iraq's second most important arms trading partner. Also missing from this statistic is the main area of German exports to Iraq: militarily relevant technology transfer and installations construction. Consequently, the true share of the Federal Germans in Iraqi armament might be several times as great.

Iraq's need has changed over the years. Whereas initially the state invested heavily in its infrastructure and civilian installations—the road transport supply link, important today in the war, the highway from the Jordanian border to Basra in Southern Iraq, came into being with German help—from the beginning of the 1980's on, the conflict with Iran led to a cutback in these investments. From this time on, Iraq used its foreign exchange income primarily for the purchase of military goods. Large amounts were delivered on credit; the oil reserves which the country possesses were considered sufficient security by the arms exporters.

In the years 1986 and 1987 a new phase of industrial investments became evident, but with a new orientation. Now, billions were spent for the purpose of establishing domestic arms production capabilities with the help of foreign know-how and foreign technological components and of becoming self-supporting to the greatest extent possible. This involved domestic gun and munitions factories, missile production facilities, and plans for an

aircraft industry, as well as for plants in which chemical and nuclear weapons can be developed and built.

The sums mentioned for the German involvement in Iraq, in connection with the Federal Government's statement that it does not deliver armaments to regions in crisis, has meanwhile created major indignation abroad. An important reason for the massive attacks from the United States, among others, is the quality of the exports: German technical know-how and German machinery for war materials production, as well as entire armament factories, are said to have enabled Iraq to produce and modernize large quantities of poison gas, guns, and intermediate-range missiles. The archive of the church-based armament opponents, the Idstein Communications Center, concludes regarding this: "This type of business usually has more devastating effects than the export of a few tanks and aircraft. Furthermore, it has the advantage of establishing long-term supply relationships and as a rule does not attract as much attention."

The Idstein Communications Center has undertaken to bring the "facts, which the Iraqi policy of aggression made possible," to the awareness of the public. "Only if it is possible to mobilize the public against this dealing in death will a basic ban on arms exports be achieved in Germany," the members of the institution believe. The center, KOMZI for short, initiated by the Catholic Pax Christi movement, is today helped by, among others, the Protestant movement Conciliation Sign Peace Services Action, the Services for Peace Working Group and "medico international." KOMZI maintains an archive on arms exports from Germany. At Idstein and in the Bremen office of the Development-Political Action Groups (BUKO), media reports and research results from journalists and opponents of arms exports are gathered and evaluated. Tips from employees of the arms industry are followed up with painstakingly detailed work. The Gulf conflict and knowledge of the responsibility Germany shares in the Iraqi armament have aroused a great deal of interest in the activity of the two little working groups and their long-neglected subject area.

Both archives have compiled long lists of militarily useful deliveries by German companies to Iraq and worked out information brochures with analyses. The "guaranteed incomplete" list of German deliveries established at Idstein already includes 153 individual items; according to it, the military goods allegedly range from the HOT and Milan antitank missiles, through military vehicles, all the way to helicopters and aircraft. Much was produced jointly by the Germans and the French. Until the mid-1980's the weapon systems were usually exported from France, in order to get around the German export laws.

The situation is different in the area of military plant construction. German companies such as Karl Kolb, Dreieich, and Pilot Plant are said to have supplied the first pilot plants for chemical weapons to Iraq since the

early 1980's, and in the middle of the decade, with the participation of German conglomerates such as Preussag, deliveries for chemical weapons production in Samarra took place on an industrial scale. Officially, the project was declared a production plant for pesticides. Although the authorities were suspicious and initially forbade the export, the companies succeeded in carrying out additional deliveries by way of court orders. To be sure, "in all likelihood proof can be furnished that the facilities in question are suitable for the production of the relevant chemical agents," but it would "probably be difficult" to prove that parts supplied from Germany were constructed especially for that purpose. State Secretary Riedl determined in a Bundestag document of 20 December 1988. On 18 August 1990, well over two and one-half years later, the Darmstadt district attorney's office arrested seven persons in connection with deliveries to the Samarra plant.

Construction of the SAAD 16 missile research and later production center, headed by the Gildemeister company, began in 1984 as a research facility for Mosul University. Companies such as Siemens, MBB, Rheinmetall and Fritz Werner KG, which at that time was still federally owned, are among the subcontractors—and after 1986 the list at the Idstein Communications Center includes various deliveries for work on biological weapons, for another chemical weapons factory, as well as for a cannon and a missile factory. Among them are facilities in which missile fuel can be produced and drawn off.

This compilation by the church-based arms export opponents demonstrates the complex problems of export clauses and export permits. The authors indicate that in some business deals, for example the thousands of vehicles from Daimler-Benz or the various production facilities, it is a matter of "dual-use" goods, which are difficult to go after legally. A tube oven, for example, which was delivered in 1985 by the Heraeus and Labesco companies, was intended for Baghdad University and thus supposedly for peaceful purposes. But: The oven is suitable for burning highly poisonous substances. Also irreproachable at first glance may be the delivery of a 50-ton crane by MAN or of cutting tools by the Hertl company in 1989. But the products were used for gun and missile manufacture in Iraq. Another example: In 1987 temperature regulating units were delivered by Nickel Klimatechnik—are they already considered a military product, because with their help it is possible to stabilize the temperature in military chemical dumps, mixing bunkers, and fuel filling towers?

Anyone who is now mentioned in connection with armament production in Iraq puts up a vigorous defense: The ARD [Working Group of Public-Law Broadcasting Institutions of Germany] television show "Panorama" on 29 January made public a list of companies said to have participated in further development of the Iraqi Scud missiles. On 31 January, Technologie-Transfer G. Graeser GmbH stressed that "at no time either knowingly or unknowingly" was it an exporter of "arms, parts

of arms or installations for the production of arms." Anyone who maintains anything else is committing "criminal character assassination." To be sure, in mid-1989 it delivered material for a project to one of its Iraqi customers, for example, sheet steel. "But that involved without exception products which are not subject to control by the Foreign Trade Law." The content of the project, the company maintains, "was not known to us at that point in time," and "the nature of the delivered products" could "in no way" permit us to infer the application purpose.

Investigation Without Result

At the end of 1989, G. Graeser GmbH was investigated by the regional finance office in Frankfurt with respect to the Foreign Trade Law. The result, as reported by the enterprise was: "No complaints were made against us for illegal exports, either by the regional finance office or by any other state authority."

The gray zones of arms exports pose enormous problems for the state investigating and licensing authorities. In suspicious cases they must not only prove that a product which has both civilian and military application is actually intended for the military; they must also prove that this was known to the exporter and that the export permit which may have been granted was obtained while concealing this fact or even under false pretenses. Even more: If companies were involved as subcontractors and suppliers in a large illegal armament project, they must be proven guilty of having known the military purpose of their action. This is perhaps the very reason why the general contractors for sensitive exports are often small trading companies or subsidiaries—to some extent a legal protective shield for the conglomerates and their management, which is why the list of suppliers reads like a "Who's Who" of German high-technology producers.

In several instances former employees of the big contractors work in the smaller companies which are heading projects. At the W.E.T. company, suspected in connection with Iraqi chemical weapons production, there are two former employees of Preussag, for example, who are also said to have worked for the Federal Intelligence Service. In the Consen Group, a leading company in Iraq's plans to produce an intermediate-range missile of the Condor type, former employees of the firm, MBB, and its subsidiaries are to be found. MBB supervised the Condor project for Argentina until 1985.

But the most difficult legal violations to prove are those which involve the export of facilities or parts of facilities for the manufacture of war materiel. For in that case, due to the foreign trade regulations, the authorities must prove that the factories are "specially constructed" to produce military goods. This regulation has already been interpreted differently by the investigating public prosecutors, in such a way that only the export of plants designed exclusively for the production of military equipment is worth prosecuting. An "objective" difference in construction is required, even when the means of

production in question due to its specifications is obviously to be used in military production, concluded the district attorney's office of the Hof regional superior court in 1988 in the case of the Lasco Umformtechnik company in Coburg. This company delivered perforating and drawing presses for the production of hollow parts. Hollow parts are shell cartridges, for instance.

It is uncertain whether charges will even be brought for the majority of deliveries to Iraqi arms enterprises. The public prosecutors have already "indicated that not enough material remains to prosecute," the Federal Government states in its "Report on the Participation of Federal German Companies in Arms Deliveries and Militarily Relevant Technology Exports to Iraq" of 21 August 1990, concerning, for example, the SAAD 16 rocket research center in Mossul.

Public Exposure

Precisely in the area of plant construction, which is difficult to sort out, is where most of the militarily relevant exports from German companies to Iraq have taken place in the last few years—as well as the particularly controversial German exports: the deliveries to chemical factories and to research and production plants for missiles. Under the pressure of international publicity, tighter arms export regulations and use of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution within the framework of federal investigations are under consideration.

The MBB company in Ottobrunn near Munich rejects all accusations. In a press report yesterday it characterized "the attempt to publicly expose the enterprise for having evaded the Iraqi embargo" as "information fraud." The company has never undertaken any illegal export business, either with Iraq or with other countries.

Just how serious the politicians are in their readiness to pull out all the stops in order to clarify German deliveries in the past will soon become evident: The delegates of Alliance 90/Greens expect the Bundestag to establish an investigating committee, which will examine German arms exports to Iraq. Their corresponding motion of urgency was not included on the agenda last Wednesday, of course. But that need not have been the last word. After all, the legislative period has only just begun.

Reports on Arms Deals With Iraq

UK, FRG Involvement in Germ-Warfare Plant
AU0502204191 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
4 Feb 91 pp 33-35

[Unattributed report: "Nerves Laid Bare"]

[Text] The British engineer Chris Cowley was ecstatic. The plant was "absolutely brilliant," an "ideal construction," he stated enthusiastically. There was always sufficient money. He had never seen anything comparable anywhere in Europe.

That was how the weapons expert described the situation in the town on the Tigris, Mosul, a few months ago, where he participated in the largest military research program in the Middle East.

Thus, the Dr. Mabuses from the West [criminal scientist from German film] worked with their Iraqi assistants, shielded from nosy people, on the huge complex protected by missiles and guards. An Israeli Phantom aircraft was downed during a reconnaissance flight in 1986.

The Phantom aircraft could at least have provided pictures of the outside of the giant witches' kitchen comprised of 78 laboratories. In some research centers, chemical engineers and technicians allegedly experimented with nerve gas and culture mediums for biological weapons.

Antitank missiles were tested in firing tunnels, propellant charges for modified Scud-B missiles were developed, and small missiles and warheads with highly explosive ammunition were built. In other laboratories, nuclear physicians were developing plants for the construction of the atomic bomb, and ballistics experts experimented with a model of the legendary supergun. Cowley allegedly helped build the giant mortar [moerser] for the gun.

All that probably no longer exists. The project called Saad 16 was one of the main targets of the allied forces. Eyewitnesses spoke of particularly heavy damage.

However, the Mosul case has not yet been settled. The affair must now be dealt with legally, and that is taking place in the FRG. The main contractor of the project involving 1.6 billion German marks [DM] was the Bielefeld-based Gildemeister Projects GmbH company (Gipro), a subsidiary of the tool manufacturer Gilde-meister AG.

Investigations of Gipro have been under way since March 1989. Innumerable files were examined at the public prosecutor's office in Bielefeld. The prosecutors checked over 1,600 individual contract items. In every individual case, officials had to examine whether the company had obtained an export permit.

The outcome of nearly two years of investigations will lead to an indictment. However, in view of the enormous volume of the investigations, the two offenses that will be prosecuted seem to be of a minor nature: There were no certificates for a computer with a spectrometer and a small computer.

As a matter of fact, the companies involved would already have been indicted, but the Bonn Economics Ministry, whose Federal Economic Office in Eschborn generously permitted the export with the exception of the computers, objected. The ministry in Bonn urged an extension of the indictment—a novelty in Germany's arms export policy.

The officials in the ministries adopted a new strategy. The negative certifications required for such exports

were apparently merely a formal matter. The export of important parts was declared unobjectionable without lengthy procedures. It was easy to obtain export permits for so-called dual-use goods that can be used both for military and civilian purposes. Officially, they were always destined for research projects.

This was no coincidence and apparently not the deed of a corrupt or lazy official either. Saddam Husayn's pet project enjoyed large-scale support in Bonn. It is characteristic that the state-owned Fritz Werner Industrial Plants GmbH company had a good chance at getting the order for the Mosul project, which involved millions of marks, instead of Gildemeister. However, the Hesse-based company withdrew its offer shortly before the signing of the contract because it did not want to offend its good customer Iran.

Gipro has denied any evil intentions to this very day. That is somewhat nervy, because the deal was not exactly characterized by correctness. Measurements and weights were reduced in the export applications, and descriptions were changed. According to intelligence service agents, there were two different delivery lists in Iraq and in Germany, which caused confusion sometimes. The German list was much more general, and the list for Iraq included an exact description of the purpose. Documents show that it required numerous clarifications.

Sometimes Gipro simply changed the export documents and told the Iraqis: "The equipment that will actually be supplied will conform to the original contract." (DER SPIEGEL 5/1991)

The deal went off smoothly, despite a warning by Israel concerning the military character of the plant. The project was only stopped in 1987, and as of 1988 all applications submitted were rejected, and in May 1989 permits granted earlier were withdrawn. At that point, Saad 16 was already an exemplary military enterprise.

After the Bonn Foreign Ministry had submitted an expert report to the Public Prosecutor's Office, claiming that Germany's foreign relations were considerably damaged in two cases through Saad 16, the Economics Ministry finally intervened: In at least five major cases, including significant missile projects, the control authorities were deceived by Gipro. The enterprise obtained the export licenses by giving false indications.

The prosecutors were surprised about Bonn's objection. The public prosecutors think they know better. As a matter of fact, they are also in possession of the apparently falsified documents, but after careful examination of the files they came to the following conclusion: The documents furnish conclusive evidence that Bonn knew about the actual deliveries. If that is true, the government will have to draw the consequences and take actions concerning personnel.

The case also shows clearly that the subcontractors have nothing to fear if such a huge project is involved. As a

matter of fact, charges have been brought against "Gildemeister and others," but none of the numerous German firms involved, or the 38 German companies that organized the training program in Mosul are facing punishment. The trial against "others" will be dropped.

The Daimler-Benz subsidiary, Messerschmidt-Boekow-Blohm, in particular, which has fallen into disrepute internationally, comes off well. The reputation of the president of the Employers' Association, Klaus Murmann, will not be damaged either. As a matter of fact, the Sauer Informatic GmbH company from Neu-muenster, managed by Murmann, supplied a DM10-million computer plant for the Saad 16 project.

The subcontractors affirm that they did not know exactly what kind of project it was. They did not know any details. Only Gipro was informed.

Some of the stockholders apparently believed that Gipro knew too much. Some of them withdrew from the project—naturally for economic reasons. First, the West German Provincial Bank sold its 10 percent share of stock to Gildemeister, and later the Murmann family also sold its 17 percent share, and finally the largest foreign stockholder, the U.S. company Litton Industries Inc. of Beverly Hills withdrew from the project.

The U.S. company bought stock from Gildemeister in 1984, the first year of the Mosul project, and offered his 14.3 percent on the stock exchange in 1989, two months after the opening of investigations. Litton had quadrupled the sum he originally invested in five years.

During the trial, more details that are unpleasant for the Americans may emerge. U.S. companies are involved in deals with Saddam's businessmen to a greater extent than originally assumed.

According to experts' estimates, U.S. enterprises delivered 40 percent of the high-tech equipment for the Saad 16 project. Renowned companies such as Hewlett Packard and Electronics Associates participated in the project. Despite the ban of the delivery of a large computer for Saad 16 issued by the U.S. Defense Department in 1986, the U.S. Commerce Department approved the delivery in February 1990.

Between October 1986 and August 1990 alone, the U.S. authority granted 500 permits for the export of dual-use goods to Iraq. The exports involved \$728 million and included highly sensitive goods, such as a flight simulator and high-tech electronics equipment.

The authorities in Bonn have for a long time been annoyed about the fact that the Untied States, which supplied satellite photographs to Saddam during the first Gulf war and which delivered a considerable portion of murderous hardware to Iraq, now constantly harps on German companies. Particularly the numerous U.S. allegations concerning alleged violations of the embargo have laid bare nerves in Bonn.

Thus, it was hardly a coincidence that a German television team appeared when a mass spectrometer made by the Thermo Jarell Ash Corporation from Massachusetts, destined for Iraq, was seized at Frankfurt Airport, and that the camera showed the shipping documents.

Sometimes it is even difficult for experts to maintain their orientation in view of the numerous shady dealings with Saddam. A sextant seems to be required. Thus, the Hamburg-based navigation company C. Plath is suspected of having built several gyro compasses for the Iraqi Scud-B missile. The order involved tens of millions of marks.

However, the enterprise, which is over 100 years old, pretends not to have known anything, and that strategy will probably also be adopted by its mother company, the former majority stockholder of Gildemeister: Litton Industries of Beverly Hills.

Havert Admits Supplying Scuds

LD0502131191 Hamburg DPA in German 1202 GMT
5 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Neu-Isenburg (DPA)—The Havert company in Neu-Isenburg near Offenbach in Hesse today admitted having supplied material and equipment for the construction of the Iraqi Scud missiles. However, Managing Director Guenther Paul declared at a news conference that the company did not know that the project number 144/5 was the Iraqi missile project. "Do you think that a trade company each time asks the client what the material supplied can be used for," Paul said. Paul continued to deny having delivered valves to increase the range of Scud missiles. [passage omitted]

'Mobile Toxicological Labs' Supplied

AU0502153091 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
4 Feb 91 p 34

[Unattributed report: "Stay Out of It"]

[Text] "He is a strong man for whom it is worth fighting," entrepreneur Anton Eyerle, 67, says about Iraqi head of state Saddam Husayn. For years the former National Democratic Party politician Eyerle concluded comprehensive deals with the Iraqi military ("They are people who still have character").

In the office of the head of the Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeubau in Kaufbeuren, Bavaria, there is a converted "people's receiver" [radio from the Third Reich]. On a tape recorder concealed there, Eyerle likes to replay booming speeches by Adolf Hitler. The gaunt Eyerle, who served in Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe, is enthusiastic about warlord Saddam: "This is as it was in my youth."

Such empathy has brought the Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeubau, Gewerbestrasse 61, big business orders over the past

10 years. From the Allgaeu region, the medium-size enterprise delivered vehicles with "special superstructures" all over the world.

In 1982 the Iraqis ordered Rhein-Bayern to mount a box-like superstructure on normal Daimler-Benz trucks. It hid a battery of compressed-air bottles, which are controlled via an independent filling system. As the main contractor, the Munich company Bauer-Kompressoren delivered, with an official permit, the technical equipment for the "special bottle transporters" from Kaufbeuren.

Eyerle's business partners told him that the compressed air with a pressure of up to 350 bar is necessary for "airplane take-offs." In fact, the compressed air is used for the quick take-off of combat planes. Deliverer Eyerle claims that he learned about the military purpose of his vehicles only through a phone call by the Munich public prosecutor. In total, 175 Daimler-Benz vehicles with compressed-air bottles were delivered for the air war in the Gulf.

One year later Eyerle received another large-scale order from Baghdad. Against tough Italian competition, the former representative of truck constructor Magirus-Deutz mediated the delivery of 700 ambulances. A complete medical station for four patients was built on the chassis of cross-country Magirus-Deutz trucks for "extreme use."

Three prototypes of the four-wheel transporter were previously tested in northern Africa by the Magirus-Deutz vehicle concern from Ulm, which is called Iveco Magirus AG today. However, in the view of experts, the medical vehicles, which were marked with a red crescent for export, served completely different purposes: The robust vehicle is used for troop transports in the sands of the desert. In 1988 Baghdad ordered another 263 ambulances. "The equipment," Rhein-Bayern says in its advertisement, "is coordinated individually with the client."

And, according to company head Eyerle, the most sensitive order to Rhein-Bayern also served purely civilian purposes. But he stalls: "Stay out of it." During a visit to Iraq, which Saddam's friend may visit without the visa that is usually necessary, he got to know the local representative of the Karl Kolb company from Hesse at the Baghdad International Hotel. The company for "scientific laboratory equipment" from Dreieich is accused by U.S. and German authorities of having participated in the construction of poison gas facilities in Iraq.

In March 1982 a leading employee of Rhein-Bayern went to Kolb in Dreieich at Eyerle's order. There he discussed with Iraq expert Klaus Fraenzel the equipment of eight mobile "toxicological laboratories." A person who was involved in the talks recalls that the Kolb associate did not want to give "any further details" about the use and purpose of the mobile chemical laboratories.

In the same year Iveco Magirus, as the general contractor, delivered to Kaufbeuren for the Iraq deal eight vehicles "with military varnish" and tires usable in the Sahara. The Eschborn Federal Economic Office had previously approved the export to Iraq.

With the assistance of an English Kolb engineer, who had come just for that purpose, the sand-colored 16-tonne Magirus trucks were equipped with a complete laboratory. According to an examination of the construction plans by the German Society for Chemical Apparatuses in Frankfurt, information available to DER SPIEGEL, they were "laboratories for standard analyses."

However, with this it is also possible to detect and investigate chemical and biological combat agents from nuclear, biological, and chemical troops. On the Rhein-Bayern premises, Bundeswehr experts looked at the eight poison laboratories, which cost 280,000 marks each and which were shipped via Bremen to Iraq in 1984. Eyerle: "My client was in Ulm. It was purely a domestic deal."

Nevertheless, shortly afterwards a Rhein-Bayern engineer repaired the water system of the chemical laboratories in Iraq, which were located at a closed military camp. Says Ernst-Ulrich Kuhlenschmidt of Iveco Magirus: "With this it is possible to analyze samples of air, water, soil, or foodstuffs."

Near the end of 1987 the human rights organization "Society for Endangered Peoples" in Goettingen passed on the first clues concerning the potential combat agent laboratories from the Allgaeu to the Darmstadt Public Prosecutor's Office, which filed the material away. Three years later the investigators went to Rhein-Bayern.

Ex-GDR Firms Accused

AU0502134591 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
5 Feb 91 p 5

[Ralf Freitag report: "Military Help for Iraq Also Came from Thuringia"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—Until last June, Iraq received large quantities of weapons and weapons components from enterprises in the former GDR, and—in particular from Thuringia—"equipment that can be used for combat," Matthias Buechner, chairman of the Thuringian group of New Forum and a deputy in the Erfurt legislature told DIE WELT yesterday.

Matschenz, the head of the exports department of the Engineering-Technical Foreign Trade GmbH [Ingenieurtechnische Aussenhandels-GmbH], confirmed to DIE WELT that field messes, repair and maintenance vans, as well as "large amounts of" communications field wires were delivered to Iraq in the past few years. However, there have not been direct weapons exports to Iraq. Engineering-Technical GmbH used to be one of the most important arms exporting enterprises of the former

GDR. Matschenz admitted that last year the Dresden aircraft yard was still maintaining and repairing Iraqi MiG-21s and 23s.

At question time in the Thuringian body, Minister President Josef Fuchac expressed the suspicion that arms or arms components were supplied to Iraq from Thuringia. He mentioned the Carl-Zeiss-Jena company and the hunting weapons factory of Suhl.

The management of the Jena company has meanwhile stated that target systems for Soviet-made tanks, which the enterprise used to produce, as well as control systems for air-defense missiles were not supplied to Iraq. However, it was added that in the fall of 1989, "microscopes, measuring technology, and spare parts worth some 100,000 clearing marks" were supplied.

The manager of the Suhl weapons factory, Rolf Koelner, also denied supplying weapons to Iraq. [passage omitted]

Government Tightens Arms Export Controls

LD0602142991 Hamburg DPA in German 1308 GMT
6 Feb 91

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government today took further steps against illegal arms exports. The cabinet agreed to stricter controls and harsher penalties, including the confiscation of all profits from illegal arms deals as proposed by Federal Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann (Free Democratic Party). The Bundestag now plans to change the criminal law and the foreign trade law.

The Customs Office will be allowed in the future to tap telephones and open mail if there are indications of a serious crime. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution will not be allowed. The surveillance must be ordered by a judge. The person concerned is to be informed only when this is possible without jeopardizing the investigation. In addition, the Federal Intelligence Service is to pass on information obtained by its own mail monitoring to the prosecuting authorities. [passage omitted]

In addition, the minimum penalty for violation of UN sanctions is to be raised from six months to one year. The maximum penalty in all cases will be 10 years. Deals using front men and export deals where false information is given, currently treated as infringements of regulations, will be covered by the extended crime definition. [passage omitted]

In addition to the proposed legal changes, the cabinet adopted the 14th amendment to the Foreign Trade Regulations. It says that participation in all arms projects—not only missile projects, as now—as well as the export of civilian goods, require permission if the exporter knows about their use in arms projects. [passage omitted]

Company Developed Missile Engine Testing for Iraq

AU1102111491 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
11 Feb 91 pp 16-17

[Unattributed report: "Plans to Baghdad"]

[Text] The Karlsruhe Public Prosecutor's Office has obviously found an important helper of Saddam Husayn in the Anlagen Bau Contor company in Stutensee-Blankenloch. Engineer Holger Beaujean's company developed a complete testing facility for missile engines for Iraq. It is a mixing plant for various liquids, including inhibited red fuming nitric acid, kerosene, and UDMH (unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine). According to experts, UDMH is primarily used for missile fuel. The project was ordered by Transmerkur, a mailbox company in Liechtenstein. The Iraqis are behind Transmerkur. The partners in the deal camouflaged the facility—delivery price 1.848 billion German marks—as a "complete mixing station" for the "petrochemical industry." The investigators also found the textbook formula for Scud fuel in the plans. Beaujean, who rejects the accusations, met his Iraqi business partners in August 1990. The investigators are sure that "the plans accompanied him to the Middle East."

Soviet W. Pomeranian Troop Withdrawal Announced

LD1102184191 Berlin ADN in German 1555 GMT
11 Feb 91

[Text] Schwerin (ADN)—This year, the first units—about 1,100 soldiers and 600 civilian employees—of the Soviet Army are to be withdrawn from Mecklenburg/Western Pomerania. This was announced today by representatives of the Western Group of Soviet forces after a meeting of the working committee set up by the land government to deal with the withdrawal.

Approximately 40,000 soldiers and officers are stationed in that federal land. They are to return home by 1994. At present, the Soviet Army is using a territory of 22,000 hectares and 127 estates in Mecklenburg/Western Pomerania.

NORWAY

Defense Minister Criticizes Soviet CFE Compliance

EN02304 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian
1 Jan 91 p 10

[Article by Erik Sagflaat: "Military Power on the Kola Peninsula Causes Problems for Norway"—first paragraph is ARBEIDERBLADET introduction]

[Text] The agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe is causing problems for Norway, among other things where reorganization of armed forces on the Kola Peninsula is concerned.

It is not acceptable to Norway that the Russians are reclassifying former ground forces to naval forces, referring to the fact that the Navy is not included in the so-called Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement.

"The text shows clearly that the agreement includes all equipment in the area, no matter how it is organized—so we shall have to go a few more rounds with the Russians concerning this matter," Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst says to ARBEIDERBLADET.

The Kola Peninsula

Holst points to the fact that Norway, no matter what, will have to live with significant military forces on the Kola Peninsula.

"No matter what, the Soviet Union—or maybe Russia in the future—will remain a considerable nuclear power. There will be nuclear weapons up north. There will be a strong defense against invading planes and missiles, and the Soviets will have one of their two oceangoing fleets there. But our goal must be that these forces be arranged in such a manner that they cause us the smallest amount of alarm possible," Holst says, stressing that a planned military maneuver with as many as 17,000 troops in the Petshenga area is not confidence inspiring.

"We must make it clear, so that the Soviets understand that such a large exercise this close to our border is not without problems for us, even if we are invited to send observers," Holst says.

Dubious/Questionable Data

Holst says to ARBEIDERBLADET that Norway is considerably troubled with some of the data the Soviets have

quoted in connection with the CFE agreement concerning the conventional forces disarmament in Europe. There is a thick book against which Norway has made many objections.

"Among other things there is concern that there are items the Soviets have claimed that they do not have, but which we know they have," Holst says, not wishing, however, to be more specific about what this is all about.

"The Soviets have also advanced the move of material and forces out of the area, and the agreement does not allow this," Holst says.

East of the Urals

The Soviet Union is moving a great deal of equipment out of the area covered by the agreement to an area east of the Urals.

"This gives us greater security because the early warning time is longer now than when this equipment was placed in the GDR. At the same time much depends on whether the equipment stored east of the Urals will be deployed with active forces which can be redeployed in Europe relatively quickly. We must make sure that the equipment stored outside this zone will not be stored in such a fashion that it can re-enter the zone quickly.

"We must take the initiative in the areas concerning ourselves. As far as security is concerned, there is much to be won for Norway in the CFE agreement—as long as the Soviets do not insist on different interpretations. That might make the whole situation look different. But we must assume that the agreement will be adhered to."

Photography

Essential to the CFE agreement is also extensive permission to inspect. A new openness seems to be coming, concerning photography among other things, and this is a great breakthrough.

"This will have consequences also in connection with the keeping of secrets in our Defense Ministry," Holst says. "I can, for instance, see no more reason in the present situation to maintain the ban against photography at our airports, a ban SAS and Braathen are charged with enforcing."

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